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CA September 1# 1939, the dark clcmd which bad 
havarad ever Europe for tha pravloua twenty yaara 
finally umleaahed It# tragic eontenta* Before the 
atorm aubalded al% yeara later* over half of the globe 
had been waahed In tha blood of mankind* Imperceptible 
to moat̂  %ia *tor* began to form Immediately after the 
1919 Peace Conference and aa the yeara paaaed it gradw* 
ally Inoreaaed In gl%e and threat* finally aaaimlng 
the ahape of a wlld̂ eyed* dark-halred, muatachload 
little man #ieae voice pealed like thunder from tha 
beer halla of Munich* By 1935* a few realized Ita 
ômlnoua portent* many more aaw and ohoae to Ignore It* 
thinking It would paaa and become abaorbed In the 
atmoaphare of a false peace* Conaequently* not until 
1939 did the world fully realize that a major cataatro'* 
phe waa upon It# 
If Napoleon waa child of a revolution* Hitler 
waa bom of a peace treaty# When the victorious powers 
met at Veraalllea In 1919* they faahloned five funda* 
mental Ingredient# into what they called a formula for 
ptttOfiî in reality, it may be argued# they wrote out 
ft recipe for war# Eeaentlally, the terms provided fori 
territorial change* eomnenaurate with the idea of aelf* 
determination* reparatlona in reatitutlon for beginning 
an agree#Ive warf dlearmament and deailitarination| 
eeourlty; and the Covenant of the league of Katioma # 
In eome meaeurê  all five directly affected defeated 
Germany* 3he te%%# of Veraaillea were hard and ex*» 
acting but hardly Carthaginian In nature# They were the 
remult of a mucoeaalon of compromleee# While the other 
vlctorioua powere, notably Oreat Britain, favored lea# 
demanding term#, Â anoe, with her traditional fear of 
German might, Inalated upon a proatrate Germany* Inatead 
of an atmoephére of tranquility, the peace conference 
created a peychoal# of war, and with It the aaaertlon 
of Oerman "war guilt," an aoouaatlon no German waa willing 
to accept* Thua, the peace conference convoked to end 
future war# produced a and Hie "Diktat* helped 
give rlee to a dictator Wlio In turn completed the vicloua 
circle by beginning another war* 
Rpom 1919 to 19%, becauae of reparation payment# 
and military occupation, Germany suffered constant and 
peraonal reminder# of defeat* fot until the conclualon 
of the locamo Pact in 1928 by Germany, Great Britain, 
Prance, Italy, and Belgium did Germany attain any 
degree of equality with other nation## In 
addition to other measures, locamo provided for a 
joint guarantee of Oermany*# weetern frontier# and 
the demilitarized Rblnelaad aone, and a# a reeult 
created a more peaceful atmoephere for the next four 
year# and prepared Germany*# entry Into the League of 
Nation# In 1926* The Locarno eplrlt wae ehort-llved, 
however» for ae the financial erlel# beoame the focal 
point of world attention, the year 1929 fo\md Europe 
once again torn by anxletlee* 
%trougbOBt the po#t#war period# reparation# 
conetltuted one of Burope*# #oet eerion# problem## It 
wa* a bitter pill for Germany to ewallow, not only 
beea%#e ehe wa# financially bankrupt but al#o beoauae 
the payment of refmratloiw implied eole guilt for the 
war# To facilitate the otmAereome reparation pmyment#, 
the Dawe# flw went Into effect In 192* but ended in 
failure five year# later# C%#equently, becanee of 
Oezmany*# reluctance and inability to keep up her 
obligation# and owln̂  to the decline In European 
proeperity, the 3bung Plan urn# in#tltuted to provide 
a eaner, more liberal reparation# policy* The Young 
Plan really never went into effect» however* for a# 
the d#prea#lon deepened, hope wa# largely abandoned 
of continu lag the present #y#tem of reparation»# In 
1931, freeldent RoAver propomeA A one year mormtorlim# 
and in 193B Cb»no#13.or Bruenlog annoianoed Gemmny** 
Inability te contlmie paywnt#* 
1952* diaarmmment once again one of the 
main problem# confxronting European atateemen# It bad 
been %ie of the principal iaeuea evolving from the 
%egty of Vereallleê  the idea being that all natlone 
would dieana on a baaim of equality* While attractive 
in theoiy, it wee dieeppointlng in practice# France 
had remained the atrongeat military power in Europe and 
her friande had maintained their armie# at an impreaalve 
etrenglh* %!# waa rankling to a Germany now almoat 
totally diaaraed, and ao it waa with eome juatifioation 
that Obanceller Bruenlng# at the opening of tW #orld 
Diaarmament Conference In 19*8, put forward Gergmny*# 
claim to rearm on a baal# of equality with other 
natioiw# Prance» on the other hand, propoaed an 
international military force* Between the two* Great 
Britain followed an uncertain, vaeillatlng policy# By 
the end of 1930, a compromlae propoaal had been 
advanced but one which each atate Interpreted differ*» 
m&tly, ao that by the end of the year the cauee for 
dlaarmam«at waa ateadily loaing ground, finally reaching 
Ita demiae whan Hitler came to power in 1955# 
Ih evaluating Anglo*German relatione between 1919 
and 1955, certain baaic facta aeam to b# paramount# 
Flrat, it must be remembered that Germany enjoyed, 
during thla period, very little of «bat might b# 
oalled an Independent foreign polloy# T*hat amall 
amount of independence abe did have waa cloaely tied 
to the Treaty of Veraalllea and tbroû  it to th# 
League of Mations so that she #ae generally almost 
entirely dependent upon the pollclea of the other Great 
Pewera* Oonaequently» Germany lacked any real power 
to màke bilateral agreeawnta and Ita foreign policy la, 
hereby, difficult to evaluate# Thla «aa clearly 
perceptible in 1931 vhen Qermany# In an attempt to 
aolve her financial dilemma, waa prevented from 
joinlog Auatrla in a ouatome union largely beoauae of 
Pfench objection#* Ih general, however, Germany warn 
much lege boa tile to Great Britain# Rpance #aa a till 
her real enemy and the principal barrier to her ever 
again becoming a flret»rate ix)wer# Aa a reault, 
Germemy looked to Britain aa her only hope in breaking 
the ehacklea of Veraalllea and freeing Imraelf of 
diplomatic laolatlon# 
The British eeemed to reciprocate thla friendly 
spirit# Britain*a policy during this period, however, 
eeaentlally aeemed to be one of allaying French feara 
of Germany on the one hand and helping Germany overcome 
her feeling of Inferiority and resentment on the other 
without taking aides with either one» Great Britain 
failed to appreciate Prance*a traditional fear of 
Germany and often appeared to look upon Rpanoe aa more 
of a potential enemy than Gerimny* Several time# 
during thla period, Britain found hereelf at odda with 
her old ally of World War I and did not want to se® a 
powerful Prance th# domlxmnt force in European politic#» 
Other factora alao oauaed Great Britain to 
adopt a friendly attitude towarda Germany* Britain 
wanted to aee a atronger, awre proaperoua Germany emerge 
from the aahea of World War I hecauee ahe felt that a 
atable Germany would commercially benefit both countrlee* 
She did not̂  aa aome maintain, f#ar an economic rivalry 
to any great extent* In addition# ahe looked favorably 
on a atrong Germany aa a bulwark agalnat 1±ie communiât 
threat from the eaat# It 1* eaay to exaggerate the 
Importance of thla factor In term* of a proapectlve 
Ruaalan Invaalon of Europe; on the other hand Britain 
had juatlflable feara that Germany ml̂ rht undergo an 
Internal converalon to oommMnlam# But probably her 
moat Important reaaon for favoring a atrong Germany 
lay In Britain*a dealr* to aee eatabllahed In central 
Europe a force atrong enough partially to off-aet the 
powerful position of Prance, In thla* ahe returned to 
her old policy of the b&lano* of power, a policy which 
had to be revised #om#wh*t to conform to the aplrlt 
of Vereaille# and her eommitmente in the Î agwe of 
Ratioma » 
In etonmary, theref'̂ re, it oan be «aid that 
Anglo-German relatione from 1919 to 1935, and even up 
to 1938, reeted on a fairly friendly baele* Perhape 
mere than anyone else* Britain #ae reeponelble for the 
remtoratlon of a etrong German etate* In thle lights 
It 1# not difflowlt to imderetand Britain** later 
policies of appeaeement# They were not new, for they 
had their origin# in the period from the Treaty of 
Verealliee to the rlee of Adolph Kltler, 
When Hitler came to power In 1965, he wae not 
unaware of Great Britain*# P##t frlendlinee# toward# 
Oermeny* Kor had hi# eerller admlMitlon for the Grltleh 
changed, m M#ln Kampf. Hitler had revealed an early 
admiration for the Brltiah# *̂ lth England alone," he 
#ald, *oonld one begin the new Geiimanlc Invasion# To 
gain her favor no aaerifloe ehould be too great," 
Bl# action# upon accee#ion to power indicated that he 
1 
Adolph Hitler, Main Kenmf. (*ew York* Reynal 
& Sltohcook, 1939), 16B%3ST 
»Qm 
had not altered theme earlier feeling#* Da fact. In 
1933 the Idea of securing an alliance with Great 
Britain oonetituted the nimher one point of hi# 
foreign policy program* Hitler #ae not motivated by 
feeling# of brotherly love for the Britlah, however» 
for hi# policy *a# one of trying to convince Britain 
that Ru##ia$ being Germany*# obviou# enemy, was al#o 
Britain*# enmay» and that a etrong Germmny would be 
Britain'# beat guardian againat a Ruaaian threat fr<w 
the eaat* In other wrd#̂  Hitler wa# willing to 
reoogniae Britlah aupremacy on th* aea# for a free 
hauad in eaatem Europe# 
When Hitler fallad in hi# early attempt# to reach 
an alliance with Great Britain, he began to look around 
for #omeone who could complete thl# important taak# In 
thl# regard, he became intereated in a rl#lng young 
diplomat named Joachim von Rlbbentrop* Prom the time 
of hi# firat meeting with Hitler in 1938, Hibbentrop 
began to play an ever increaaing role in the fuehrer*# 
foreign policy, and between 1934*1939 hi# Influence 
with Hitler increaeed #o rapidly that eventually he 
wa# to become Hitler*# "second Biemarck#" Although at 
the outeet both Hitler and Ribbentrop were pM-Britlah, 
both believing that an alliance with Great Britain 
could be obtained, it was Ribbontrop, much before Hitler, 
who realised that thlg eould never be# 
But despite the favorable relatione existing 
between Great Britain #nd Oermany between 1919 and 
1933 and despite Hitler*» prô B̂rltleh sentimentay the 
two countrlea In 1959 fotmd themaelvee once again at 
war# Whyf Did Rltler believe that beosnee Britain 
had favored a etronger GemwLny after Verealllea that 
ahe would not oppoee him If he attacked PolandT Or wae 
It beoaixee he believed that on the baele of Britain*# 
record of appeaeement and pacification she wag too 
weak and cowardly to fight a rearmed OermanyT If eo, 
what led him to theee convlctloae? fheee ai*e the 
l%%)ortant qiieetlone of thle paper, and a considerable 
portion of bhe anawer eeeme to lie in Joachim von 
Rlbbentrop and hi# role In Eltier*# foreign policy 
during the eventful yeara, 1954*1939# 
CEAPTBR II 
BERLim 
The life of Jomcblm vom Ribbeatrop began emld 
rather modeet clrotmataaoee # Aayone observing young 
Joaohlm during hie youth would imve #een nothing to 
fortell hie future notoriety and fWee and It le doubt*» 
ful If Rlbbentrop even gllmpeed the path that wae to 
oairy him, at Bltler*e aide# to world promlnenoe* 
But in deeorlblng Rlbbentrop*# early life, one 
le unfortunately confronted with obeoure and con-# 
flicting reporte# of the detail# have been 
fumlehed by Blbbentrop hlmwelf or by hie frlende and 
aoqualntanoee and to what extent they have been oolored 
le difficult to eay. It ie* coneequentlŷ  eafe to 
aeaume that the "offlolal"* aooount of Rlbbentrop*# 
early life 1# not entirely reliable# 
%e youngeet of three brother# and one el#tor, 
Joaohlm Rlbbentrop wa# bom on April 50# 189% In 
1 
Weeel*am"Rheln# Joachim'# father, Richard Rlbbentrop, 
Paul Seabury# The WUhelwtraece (Lo# Angelee# 
Unlverelty of California"Px̂ sa, 1ÔS4Î, 46. 
-10-
& ôaptaln In tb# R&iser*# the fifth 
generation of hie femlly to eerve e# officer in 
German enA Heneverlmn mrmiee# In treoing Rlbhentrop'e 
direct enoeetry, it appear* that the only one to attain 
even a elight degree of fame *ae general Rpiedrieh 
g 
Wilhelm Jobann Ribbentrop who eerved beelde Blueher 
at Waterloo and #a# reported to have been a cloee 
friend of Oeneral IKOrok» 
Three year# after Joaohim*# birth* the family 
moved to *̂ te (a Qermaa city eince 1871)* and there 
the mother died of tnberouloale in 1900, %ting Rlbben* 
trop reoeived hi# early education in the ̂ ieerliehe# 
ty%enm in Mete* #hile in Net#, hi# father encouraged 
hi# #on to oontinue hi# etudie# at a reputable mill* 
tary eohool to prepare him for an army career# Joachim, 
however, owing in part to a frail eondition inherited 
l̂%oher, Gebhard I,ebrecht von$ 1748-1819, 
frueeian Field Marehal, aided Wellington in Napoleon*# 
defeat at Waterloo; nicknamed *Mar#hall fbreard#* 
5 
Ibrok, von leartenburg, Han# David lAidwig, 
1759*1%0, German count, German Field %ar#hal, Oovemor» 
General of Baet and ?e#t Pru##ia, commanded eegment 
of Id&e Army of liberation againet Wapoleon* 
•12-
from his mother* showed little enthumlaem for the 
rigors of German militarism and chose to disappoint 
hla father by expreeaing an Intereat in 1### exacting 
field## 
%e detaile of Rlbbentrop*# early childhood are 
extremely eketohy* Even so, it ia evident that he was 
much spoiled, first by hie mother and later by hi# 
aunt, Gertrude von Rlbbentrop, who, following hi# 
mother*a death, lived for long period# in the Rlbbentrop 
hoaaehold# 51# eerly achool year# compriae a record 
of ml#ehlef, frequent bruahe# with troublê  and le## 
than mediocre #oholaatlo mehlevmmenta, except for a 
mazted aptitude f)»r l#nguagea# PuMWlAg thla lingiilatlo 
talent, and aupported by hi# aunt, Rlbbentrop apent 
the next eeveral year# atudylng in Rrenoh, 8wl### and 
&igll»h achool#* In later yeaz#, eonfllotlng report# 
were circulated regarding the reault# of theae varioua 
aoad*mlc puraulta, hla friend# maintaining that he wa# 
*an excellent atudent* ̂ lle hla enemle# eouatered 
4 
that he had been# 
a mediocre atudent; expelled from thr#e achoola 
for Infrectiona of diaclpllnef and that he dla-
#lpated a fortime inherited from an uncle In 
drinking and other debaucheriea while In London 
and Pari#, 
Regardle## of ̂ e truth of theae reporta, the 
*"#ho la Rlbbentrop," ULvinp: Age. CCCI, (Mar-Aug, 
1956), 328. 
faet remmlna that h# neither flx&lehed blm course at 
Londoa Unlverelty nor eubjected hlmmelf te exeml* 
xmtloA at #ie completion of eny of hie llnguletlc etwdlee# 
Miy Rlbbentrop oheee not to eblde by mormel ec#demlo 
procediaree rwrnlnm eomeWiet of m myetery, end he wee 
elwrnya reluctant to dlecuae thla phaee of hie life la 
later yeare# But deeplte the fact that he never 
formally completed hie London etttdlee, he managed to 
acquire considerable fluency In both french and Xnglleh# 
In addition to the aô uleltlon of theme language akllle, 
ehlch he pat to geed nee In later yeare* Rlbbentrop 
aleo mtde many Aagllmh friend#» It 1$ thl# latter 
factor that appear* to be the foundation for Rlbbentrop*# 
Anglephlllem and eblch prompted him In later year# to 
refer to England a# hie "aeeond home#* 
At the age of el̂ t̂een# Rlbbentrop left lAndon 
for Canada* During hie four year# there* he «a# 
employed varlouely am a laborer, bank clerk, time* 
keeper, and email mcale Importer of wlnem and liquor## 
Although hie #lne buelnemm wee of little euocemm, he 
did enjoy mome degree of moclal recognition# The 
Govemor*General of Canada at thlm time was the Duke 
of Connaught, (mon of ()ueen Victoria, youngemt brother 
of King Edward VII, and uncle of Maimer Vllhelm II) 
in «hose household German warn the predominant language# 
•14» 
Sine# Rlbb#ntrop could ape&k fluent Germmn, French# 
end Ingîish and posaesaed a certain social charm, it 
waa apparently not too difficult for him to aeoure 
Invitation# to aome of the featlvltle# held at Rideau 
Ha.ll* Here, hla llngulatlc aklllâ  hla talent for pley* 
Ing the violin# hla adeptneaa at tennla and bridge# a 
flair for dramatic## and the aoon*to*be famou» 
Rlbbentrop charm# enabled him to become aomething of 
% favorite In Ottawa*# better aoclal met* It wa# 
alwaya a «yatery to hi# Ottawa friend# aho later mat 
him while he waa axAeeaedor to lAndon how the Rlbben* 
trop charm had evolved Into an exaggerated and over» 
bearing arrogance# Revertheleea# the many friend# 
and acquaintance# Rlbbentrop acquired In Canada aerved 
further to enhance hi# fondneaa fbr Britain and the 
Brltlah people# 
Rlbbentrop left (̂ uaa4a at the outbreak of World 
War I and thu# avoided detention a# an enemy alien, 
The year 1914 conaequently founds him tmck in Germany# 
he enllated in the Euaaar Regiment Number 12# waa aoon 
promoted to lieutenant# and aaw action in Poland and 
Ru##la where he dlatlngulahed hlmaelf by wiimlng two 
Iron Croeaea, PIret and Second Class» In 1918# he 
P̂mul Schware# Man Rlbbentrop (lew Torki 
Julian Meaaner# Imc## 
«•15* 
##9 to Conatantlnople, but mlnoe tb$ 
particular mission, to idilch he wms attached ended 
In failure he retup%ed to Berlin later that #ame 
year* Rlbbentrop later claimed In hi# awtoblographloal 
aketeh In the German #bo*a %bo that after hie return 
to Berlin he *ae aaelgned to the one-kmndred̂ -and̂ elghty 
member German delegation te the Veraallle# Peace 
6 
Conference* But the offlolml and im*offlclal 
publloatlone relating to Wilm delegation have yet 
to reveal hla name# 
Rlbbentrop waa no exception to the thowaand# of 
oWier demoblllxed Oenman officer* #io after the war 
looked hopeleaaly about for an occupation partially 
commensurate #lth their former etatua# T#o of the 
moat cAmmon aolutlona to thle dllitimrnn were to become 
merobaat# or to marry wealth# Rlbbentrop waa more 
fortunate than moat Ih that he auoceeded In doing bo%i# 
Immediately after the w»r, Rlbbentrop once more 
entered %ie wine bualneas and begen a auccemaful 
career by bribing the aer̂ ant In charge of the liquor 
auppllea for Berlin*» officer meaaea to chennel a few 
cases his way# In this manner* he waa able to aell 
hla mercbandlae at a profit and replenlah hla atock# 
Aa Rlbbentrop*a commercial fortune# Increaaed, 
6 
Seabury* op, clt,. 47# 
.16. 
Ms social ambitions grew proportionately# In 1920, 
he married Annelle# Henckell# the daughter of Otto 
Henekell the millionaire champagne manufacturer# 
Although the eider Henckell #a# Inaufflelently impreeeed 
#ith hi# ne# aon-ln̂ law to take him into hie firm aa a 
partner, he nevertheleee contributed #ubetantlally to 
Joachim** #pirailing mucceae by manipulating aeveral 
bugineaa deala in the latter*# favor# Some of theae 
manipulation# created a virtual ownopoly In #ome brand# 
for Ribbentrop̂ # company# 
Berlin*# inflationary poet̂ ar day# were marked 
by looee morale, the breaking down of old barrier#, and 
the riae of the nouveau* ricĥ # A# one of thie latter 
group» Bibbentrop attained ooneiderable prominence# He 
made an effort to be #een at all the boi#terou# function## 
including the much publicized **tea dance#̂  which con» 
tinued to all hour# of the night# Oceaeionally h# waa 
oe#n with hi# wife» but more frequently alone* Ribben-
trop was an excellent and *ithu#la#tio dancer, two 
qualitiea that, when combined with hi# charming manner* 
made him popular at theae variou# function## 
]h 1926, Ribbentrop*# modal #tatu# received a 
boo#t wh#n he waa legally adopted by hia Aunt aertrude 
and thn# #ntitled to affix the coveted "von" befbre 
7 
his name* Most of the old German nobility sneered 
&t tblB change$ aepeclelly elnce there #es aome 
qneetlon ## to it# legality, Bwt wndaimted, Rlbben» 
trap widely publicized hla new fortune end loat no 
time in renaming hie buaineaa *The Von Rlbbentrop 
Company,* 
Still, despite the fact that he wea now a 
we&ltby merchant, the aon»ln*law of a mllllonelre, 
and & member of a titled family, Rlbbentrop*# appetite 
for aoolal prominence remained imaatlafied* He longed 
to break Into diploowtlc aoclety, and to thla end he 
exploited every %eana at hla dlapoaal* Be made an 
effort to be aeen at aa miny diplomatic ftmctlona aa 
poaalble and entertained minor dlplometlc officials at 
hla lavlah Dahlem VlllA, preaenting them with generoiia 
gift# of wlnea end liquor#, %eae effort# veaulted In 
hla becoming better kzAwn, but It waa not until be 
attached hlmaelf to Bltler** band wmgùn that they began 
to bear fruit# 
When the %ial Party flrat began to take root# 
during the 1920*#, Ribbentrop waa neither a Razl nor a 
laal eympathizer# But he waa a fanmtical anti*bol#beTl#t 
D̂epartment of State» United State# Office of 
Chief of Counael fbr Proaecution of Axle GrladLnality, 
#̂1 Qonaplraoy & AKgre##lon. I-VIII, 2 aupplement#. 
IWa&ingloa$'"fi7 Oovermaent Printing Office, 1946), 
VII, 114, Hereafter known as Haiti Conapirecy & 
..18̂  
and a clever opportunist who never failed to take 
advantage of any favorable opportunity to exprea# 
puir>llcly hie hatred of bolahevlam# There la aome 
queatlon aa to when Rlbbentrop formally joined th# 
ifaal party* Oae veralon clalma that Itwaa In 1030 
under an aaaumed name, but a more official a ou roe date# 
hla party memberahlp from 193B* However thla may b#» 
It la certain that Rlbbentrop waa active In Rati party 
olrclea on the eve of Hitler*a aoceaalon to power* 
The flrat meeting between Hitler and Rlbbentrop 
waa brought about through the effort# of Vlcoo Karl von 
Bu#low*pcbm&nte* a black aheap of a famoua family* One 
day In 1932, Hitler waa lamenting th# faot that be had 
no on# around him #io could intelligently read th# 
London Tlm#a and Temip# # Vicoo Immediately int#r#ated 
Hltl#r in von Ribb#ntrop whom he d#acrlbed aa a proaperoum 
young win# merchant fluent in both French and Bngllah 
and who had many Influential Aagllah contacta# Hitler 
waa Intereated and the two men finally met at Hitler*# 
Bergbof in Berehteagaden on Auguat IB* 1938# Hitler 
waa not only Impreased with the young win# merchant*# 
potential political value to the party but with hla 
aooiablllty a# wall# Ih the enaulng montha. Hitler 
waa a frequent dinner gueat at the Ribbontrop home; 
and he came to be equally fond of Rlbbentrop*# wife a« 
*19 
they ab&red the same taates In cuisine and art* 
Ribbentrop assieted In Hltler*a acceealon to 
power by acting as a go#betwe#n In arranging th# 
8 
m##tln betw##5 Hltl#r and von Pap#& at Rlbbentrop*# 
home In January 1053* It was at this meeting that 
th# InfamoD# bargain was struck making Hitler ohano#!-
lor* Rlbbentrop lat#r exaggerated the Importance of 
hla iK)le In Hitler*# aooeaalon to power by stating 
that It was tbroû  his mediation the Hitler government 
was formed* 
#h#in Hitler came to power In 1953* he named 
9 
Alfred Ros#nb#rg a# chief of th# Kazl Party*# for#lgn 
8 
Papen, PTaa* von G#rm#n diplomat wa# 
Military Attach# In Washington and Mexico City, 1913* 
1916* and warn expelled from D#8* for fomenting sabotage; 
Reich Chancelier (succ##ding Brw#nlitg}# June Î932* 
August 1934; R#ioh Commissar fbr Prussia, 1953; 
8p#cial Pl#nipotemtiary for the Saar# 19M"1954; 
negotiator of Concordat with th# Vatican, July 1933; 
Oeiman ambassador to Austria* 1954*193$; appoint#d 
Pl#nlpot#ntiary Minister Extraordinary on special 
mission to Austria by Bltler* 1956; awarded Golden Party 
Badge of Honor by Hitler after Anschluss; Ambassador to 
Turkey, 1959-1944$ ' 
o 
Rosenberg, Alfred * First editor of Ma«i news* 
paper, Voelkischer Boebachter. 1921; participated in 
1923 MuaTeS'"' apjpoiàîkeS Hitler's privât# envoy 
in londoD, 1935; Reichl#it#r and head of Masi Ptrty 
Office for Per#ign Policy and Idaology, 1955; R#lch 
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941; 
member of the Reichstag; publisher of party periodical, 
Nomatshefte; official Natl philosopher; author of Myth 
oT"'IEii'''''iètïï Century aid other Involved treatises on 
TKmsSTKo oTr Ine # 
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program and empowered Rlbbentrop to assist blm* In 
time, tbl* llaaon led to the fommtlon of » special 
biireau later to be known as the Buero Rlbbentrop# 
It had RO official government sanction other than a# 
tiie party*a watchdog on the Wllhelm atraaae# Soon# 
Rlbbentrop and Roaember̂  were competing with each 
other for Eltler'e favor * both with an eye on the 
foreign mlnleter** poeltlon In the foreign oiflce# 
Rlbbentrop warn not above severely criticising Rosenberg 
In an at kempt to dlecredlt him with the Riehrer* 
!Ihe competition between the two men took a 
favorable t%m for Rlbbentrop 9±ien Rosenberg was sent 
to London In May 1953 on an Important diplomatic mission* 
Both before coming to power and after* Hitler bad 
placed great emphasis on the Importance of an Anglo-
Oerman Alliance# It was* therefore* Rosenberg's task 
In 1955 to sound ô t the British as to how tills al» 
llance could best be reached. The form It was to take 
Is uncertain, but in 1955 Hitler apparently saw In a 
British alliance his only chance of breaking the 
shakles of the Versailles "Diktat*" 
The Rosenberg Mission, however, proved to he a 
significant disappointment* On Rosenberg*s arrival 
in London on May 8, 195$, he was cooly received by 
officials of the British foreign o flee* and on May 9 
-21. 
10 
A*reign Secretary Slmoa reluctantly conmented to 
an Interview with this pseudo diplomat# On May 10, 
Roaenberg made the prepoateroua error of placing a 
Bwaatlka wreath at the Cenotaph, Britain*# monument 
to her %)rld War I dead, and on the next day membere 
of the Brltleh legion snatched a*ay the *rea%i * 
calling Rosenbergfa lack of judgement %ct of 
desecration,** Rosenberg left London the following day, 
forty*el(̂ t hours earlier than sohoduled and without 
seeln̂ r̂ the prime minister, the principal object of hie 
visit. The London Time* commented the day after 
Rosenberg's departuM that *hla visit will hardly be 
regarded as a success even by those responsible for 
11 
it»** 
Rosenberg returned to Berlin disgraced In the 
eyes of his Pùehrer and leading Nazi Party officials. 
10 
Simon, Sir John Allsebrook ( PlMt Viscount of 
Stackpole Bllldor, 1940) * British Conservative Party 
mwsber who was Solicitor General, 1910-1919* Attorney 
General, with seat In Cabinet, 191&*1916; Secretary 
of State for Horn# Affairs, 1915-1916; Secretary of 
State for Pareign Affairs, 1951*1935; Secretary of 
State for Rome Affairs and Deputy leader of the House 
of Commons, 1955-1937% Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
1937̂ 1940; Lord Chancellor, 1940̂ 1945. 
11 
Seabury, og# olt"# %*37# 
Is uafortuaat® misalorn oeat him much* e«p®ôial-
y his ambition someday to booom# the Reich»» foreign 
Inleter# And thw With Roeeaherg'# dlplometlo ater In 
he decline, Rlbbentrop** begen It# eeoent# Hitler* more 
ad more Impreeeed with Rlbbentrop, meaigned him a nee 
aak. He «as to uae his Buere to oolleot and compile 
nfomatlon and acandal on every individual in Germany #md 
broad who #ma of any public conaequenee# Since thle 
atalled eorkinc even mere cloaely with offlolala of the 
orelgn office* it waa thua aa collector ef acaMal and 
umer that Rlbbentrop flrat eucceeded in getting hla foot 
ffectlvely in the front door of the Wllhelmetrasae# 
The two organlaatlona, the Wllhelm#traaae and the 
uero Rlbbentrop. ae Hitler ordered, were to complement 
ach other In all mnttera of foreign affalM# a auppoaitlm» 
hat exlated only In theory and rarely in fact# Aa a 
eault# a bitter anlmoalty developed between Rlbbentrop 
ad the career diplomate, who looked upon Ribbentrep ae 
n Interloper In dlplemacy and aa an Irreaponalble aoolal 
limber without diplomatic quallflcatlona# They fnlly 
xpected him to go the aame route aa Roaenberg, but In thla 
hey were mlataken# They groaaly underatlmated their man 
or "the poacher waa soon to become the gamekeeper.* 
•2S-
Soon after th® Reel* assumed power In 1995, 
they deadlocked the world Dlaermement Conference by 
Inaleting ttmt Oermeny be allowed to rearm on a baelm 
of eqimllty with other nation*# Coâ romlaee were 
propoeed by both the Britimh and Aerman delegation* 
but no reeulte were achieved# Finally, in October 
1933# Hitler withdrew e imultaneonely from the World 
12 
Diearmament Conference and the League of Mfationa* 
Hie decieion ehooked everyone, including high ranking 
official# of the foreign office# Even mere eiirprieing 
wae the fact that Hitler, although he withdrew from 
the I/eague and Diaarmament Conference, left the door 
open to further negotiation* by allowing it to be 
rxmored throughout the ̂ ropean capital# that be etill 
de#i%̂  a #olution to the diearmament queation* Ih 
oWier word*. Hitler made it plain that he would not 
retuMi to Geneva and that he favored bilateral agree** 
mxent* with Pranoe and Britain rather than a multi* 
lateral Î wigne diearmament pact* In thi* way, h* 
hoped to drive a wedge between the we*tern Burcpean 
countriee * 
To assist him in the execution of thi* new 
policŷ  Hitler in April 1934 appointed Joachim von 
D̂®em®nts Or patemational Affaire. 1933, ed* 
John W» wSiîiF»̂ msttTSSÏSST'*SfoîraWr¥©r«ity 
Pre**, 1934), 206 & 
24̂  
Rlbb#ntrop me Special Commimeioner for Dlmermement 
Problems & The appointment was approved by the 
15 
aging Preeident von Elndenbei% only after Hitler 
h&d peramtded him that Rlbbentrop #ae the man for 
the jobf aRparently on the grounde that one of 
Rlbbentrop*# anoeatorm had fouĵ t with Blwcher at 
lAmterloo# Eindenberg'a reaervationa were more than 
aeoonded by the top officlala of the 1fi1Jhe]matraaae 
#ho proteated that a poat of euoh reaponalbllity 
aho%ld only have been given to an experienced member 
of the foreign aervloe# Added to the Buero Rlbbentrop# 
the Inaiilt of the new appointment begaw the feud between 
Rlbbentrop and the eareer diplomat# vhioh #aa to laat 
until the end of the mar* 
8oon after hie appointment, Rlbbentrop aet off 
on a round of tripe to the weatem European capital# 
where he aooompliahed little exoept invariably to 
incur the wrath of the reaident German diplomat#* 
Rince in hi# apecial diplomatic a ta tue he waa reaponel** 
ble to no one aave Hitler# Ribbentrop arrived in theae 
IT 
Hlndenberg# Field Narabal Aiul * World %ir I 
German military leader who dethroned the Kaiaer* hero 
of Tannenberg; freaident of Germany, 19S@*1954; died 
on Augu#t 2, 1954 leaving a political teatament 
indicating in ](*aaagee auppreaaed by the Rami# when 
the do Ciment waa publlahed# a wiah not to have Hitler 
aucoeed him aa Preaident# 
•25» 
q&pltml# without Ixiformlng th* raeldomt @er*«in 
mmb&msmdor mnd then only to wmnd#r off without 
proper credeatlml* to oon«ult etmte offlol&lm on 
foreign policy, The Oermen foreign office» fruetreted 
In Ita ettempt to find out the nature of Rlbbentrop*# 
eotlvltlee. finally assigned a junior diplomat a# hi# 
14 
a##l#tant to report directly to the foreign office* 
Rlbbentrop*# flret trip# were dleappolntlng# 
Shortly after hi# appointment, he flew to London to 
15 
confer with Antony Edem and 31r Jbhn Simon In the 
hope of dlecoverlng Britain*# attitude toward the 
reopening of dlearamment dl#cu##lon## Prime Mini#ter 
Stanley Baldwin evaluated th# reeulta of Rlbbentrop*# 
14 
8oh#ar«, olt*. 104# 
is 
&den, Rt* Hon* (Robert) Anthony*Brltleh 
OoneervatlT# Party leader who im# Parllamen̂ ry Uhder 
Secretary In th# foreign Office, Mini#ter 
without Perfollo for lAague of Rmtlon# Affair#* 19&6$ 
Secretary of State for R)reign Affair# In Baldwin 
and Chamberlain cabinet#̂  1935»1958 (#uooeeded by 
Halifax)# Secretary of State for Dominion Affair#, 
1939«*1940* secretary of mtate for Parelgn Affair# In 
Churchill cabinet, 1940*1946; al#o from 1960*1955; 
Prim# Mlnlet#r, 195$»T 
16 
Baldwin 3tanley-Brltl#h Conaervatlve Party 
leader who wa# Privy Counoellor, 1980; Chancellor of 
Exchequer* 19Sg*192$; Prim# Nlni#t#r and Rrat lord 
of the Trea#ury, 1923*1984; al#o from 1904'»89 
(#ucceeded by MacDonald), and 1956*193? (#uoo$edlng 
MaoDonald and eucceeded by Chamberlain)# 
via It for the Houa# of Common# by renmrkln*: that *the 
oonvereatlonB had added nothing concerning the dla* 
armament Iseue to the materiel already lasued̂ ** and 
at the game time the Brltlmh foreign office released 
a atatement that t̂he German representative warn not 
encouraged to expect eupport from Britain for Ge%«any*m 
17 
armament pollclea.* Di Parle, Rlhbentrop met with 
am little aucceee and waa told to take hie propoaala 
to Geneva# After experlenclncr aetbacka In other 
attempt# to eell Hitler*» policy to weatem Europe* 
Rlbbentrop faded temporarily from the guropean dlpio*» 
matic gcene# 
Tbue, Rlbbentrop In the apace of a fev ahort 
year# bad rleen from meager commercial beginning* to 
a place of diplomatic prominence# Even more aurprlalng 
la the fact that #lthln t«o year# after hie flret 
meeting with Hitler, Rlbbentrop had begwa to occupy 
a elgnlflcant position In the %azl hierarchy# Hie 
achlevea#nte up to thla point were nothing to be 
heralded, but the Important factor le that he had 
eufflclently Impreeaed the Fuehrer, an Imqpreaalon 
which laid the groundwork for more Important tasks to 
come# In the couree of the next few yeare, Hitler*# 
confidence In Rlbbentrop*# abllltle# was to Increaee 
17 
Schwart, op# clt*. 105# 
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tA * point where the former wine merchant etood a# 
the man closeet to Hltler*e ear* 
Rlbbentrop re-entered the diplomatic epotllght 
In MaMĥ  1935# SlMice January, 1935# negotiation* had 
been carried on between Germany and Britain to bring 
the leader# of both countrlee together around the 
conference table# It bad been decltied earlier that 
Sir John Rlmon would vlelt Berlin* but due to Hitler*# 
Irritation at the publication of a Qrltleh White Paper 
the vlelt had been cancelled* "Qae eltwatlon warn 
further aggravated when Hitler, on March 18, 1955, 
announced the Introduction of unlvereal military 
training# (3kreat Britain, thereupon, and over the 
proteet# of France who wanted the matter referred to 
the league, decided to reopen negotlatlona on the 
propoaed Simon vleit* Agreement wae finally reached 
and the day of the vlelt eet for March l&S, 1936* A# 
orlgrlnally scheduled, the %»rtlolpant# were to hav# 
18 
been Hitler, Eden, Simon, and Weurath, but the 
%eurath, Conatantln H# Baron von German 
diplomat who wa# A%d)e#@ador to Denmark, 1919, Italy, 
1921*1930, and England, 1930-1932* On 2 June 1952, he 
wa# appointed Minister for Jperelgn Affaire and continued 
In office by Hitler; auoceeded by Rlbbentrop In 
February 1938 and appointed Preeldent of Secret Cabinet 
Council; flrat Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, 
1939; temporary retirement, 7 September 1941 (eucceeded 
by Heydrlch); final retirement, 19441 member of the 
Reichstag! member of the Reich Defease Council; Reich 
Minister without Portfolio# 
*pp@*renoe of von Rlbbentrop murprlaed the Britlah 
and gave an awkward balance to the meeting# The 
British objected but Rlbbentrop reeolved the eltuetlon 
by euggeatlng to everyone*a amemementf that Sir Erie 
Pbipp#, Brltlab #mb&ea&dor in Berlin end » bitter 
enemy of Rlbbentrop, be Invited to the oonferenoe# 
This eeemed to satisfy everyone, end the conference 
proceeded mrltbOQt further incident* 
lA generel̂  the dlacneelona produced no definite 
settlement# Bltler refuaed to %mrtlolpete In en 
eeatem mutuel eaelatenoe pect* He fevored* on the 
other bend* blleter&l non**ggreealon pacta with power# 
inter## ted In eaetem European oountrlea* and with 
respect to dlearmament̂  Bltler was particularly un* 
oompromlelng* He declared that Oerminy needed not only 
thirty*#l% divlelona (awuntlng to a ïmlf̂ m̂llllon men) 
but also all type# of armaments poeeeeaed by other 
oountrlee» He eould not atop oon#tructlon of these 
arms, he deolared, so long as other powers used them* 
Hitler also told Simon that Germany would ne#d 
a naval fore# totalling of British tonnag# and 
would expect air parity with Great Britain and P̂ nc#. 
Phlppa, Sir Eric * British jlmbasaador to 
Germany, 19@%*1957 (succeeded by Henderson); 
Ambassador to Prance, 1957*39$ 
«"S9» 
At the ooncliABlon of the dlacuamlons* h* mmde It 
perfectly ole»r to the British foreign eeoret&ry 
that Qerowny would not return to the 3LemgMe except 
on * baala of complete eqiAellty* By thla. Hitler 
laqilled that he meant equality In oolonlee a# well 
20 
a@ armamente, 
Rlbbentrop played a a lient role In the course 
of the dlectisalone, Aa on moat occaelon*̂  Eltler warn 
the dominant figure# It «net be remeaibered, however̂  
that At thle point Rlbbentrop wa« jxiet beginning to 
make hie bid for Hitler*» favor̂  and It le poealble 
that Hitler Inalated upon Rlbbent%%p'a preeence a# 
part of hla training for the poet of foreign mlnleter# 
By Mky, 1935, relatione between Great Britain 
and Germany had eteadlly Improved* On May 2, the 
21 
British prime minister, Ramaay IWieDonald, expreeeed 
In a apeeoh the hope that Britain and Germany would 
20 
Mildred Werthelmer̂  "Aim# of Hitler*a 
Pbrelgn Policy," m>relAn Policy Report#. XI 
(June 1935)# 71# 
21 
KaoDonald, (Jamea) Ramsay » leader of the 
Brltleh labor Party who waa Prime Vlnlater of Great 
Britain* Jennary-Wovember 1924 and from 1929 to 1935 
(aucceedlng and aucceeded by Baldwin both tlmea); 
author of the Geneva Protocol, 1924; lArd Prealdent 
of the Council, 1955*1957* 
"•SO"* 
BQotk arrive at some klmd of as agreement ia relation 
28 
to the limit#tion of naval ermamemt## Hitler #»# 
emoouraged# Rie idea of an Anglo*Oerman naval aEreemm&t 
had been kept alive in Germany ainee the Simon vieit* 
Hitler declared in a epeeeh before the Reiehatag ia 
Maj that he hoped to build a fleet equal te 35̂  of total 
Britieh tonnage* Although Hitler #na optimietio about 
an agreement along theae linea, hie diplomat# in the 
foreign office were not* ,Neurath warn extremely 
89 
peeaimietio# Von Hoeaoh, the aerman amhaaeador to 
London, #a# nlao doubtful» Both advieed Hitler that 
Britain would never coneent unleea the broader ieeu# 
of eeeurity was aleo dieouaeed* At thie. Hitler flew 
into a rage and ehouted, "if the [geurath and von 
Hoeaê  do not believe in the feaaibility of auoh an 
94 
agreem«at, I know one who doe# * Ribbentrop#* 
82 
Dooumtent# On D&termational Affaira. 1955# 
I# ed# Jbim ## #%e#ier-B#am#%t (̂ ndon# tWord 
imiveralty Proa#, 193#), 141* 
89 
Hoeaoh# Leopold von Attache in Bekln, 1909; 
Barie, 1910# Secretary i# Madrid# 1911; Secretary in 
London, 1911.1914# Military aervio#, 1914.1918# 
Secretary in Sofia# 1915; ia Oonatamtinople, 1916# 
Secretary to P*reign Office in Berlin, 1917# Oouneellor 
of Legation in Xorway, 1918; Charge d*affairee in 
Madrid, 1919# Ooumaellor in Parie, 1981-1988; Charge 
d'affaires in B&ria, 1983# Ambaesador in farie, 1924-
1D38; Ambaaaador to Court of St* Jamea, 1932"̂ 1636. 
Died 1936, 
24 
Schware, og# clt*. 119* 
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Bltler̂ a mnnouncem#at naming von Rlbbentrop 
ma the head of the delegation to tondon for the 
naval talk» graatly aurprlaod tb# diplomat# of the 
foreign offlo#* In fact, they were ehockeA* Rlbben*" 
tropy however# aelzed the opportunity to better hi# 
diplomatic etatue* He told Hitler that be would be 
hampered In hie negotiation# unless he enjoyed the 
eame diplomatic rank a» tho@e with whom be would be 
dealing# Hitler agreed and ĉ maleeloned him a# 
"Ambaeaador̂ at»large," a rank here*tO"*fore unheard 
of In the hierarchy of Germany*# diplomatic officialdom* 
The German delegation arrived In London on 
June 5, 195G amidet a feetlve throng celebrating the 
Rfenty4»Rlftai Jubilee of King George V and Queen Nary. 
Rlbbentrop joined In the gaiety by ordering the 
management of the Carlton Hotel to Imng a huge 
ewaetika flag over the hotel*# Raymarket entrance. He 
alao ordered hla official caw decorated with almllar 
pennant#. That evening the entire Gerwn deleĝ atlon, 
lmpre##lve in dresm unlfonn# eepecially deeigned for 
the occasion, attended a ball at Ix)ndonderry Hou#e# 
Deeplte thim merriment, the dlacueglon opened 
on June 4 aunld an atmomphere of pesalmlsm, Neither 
the Brltleh prea# nor public opinion believed that a 
substantial agreement co ,ld be reached* The German 
ambassador, von Hoesch, was especially pessimistic. 
owing partly to hla belief in the flrmneea of the 
Brltlah policy md partly to hl@ lack of faith In 
Rlbbantrop** diplomatic oxperlanca* Rlbbantrop* how** 
over» prudently left the more technical aepeote of 
the negotiation# to hie Wllhelmatraeae experte* 
On June 18* 1955;, after almoet two weelw of 
oon$t#nt negotiation*, the reeulta of the Anglo*Ger«an 
naval dlecuaalona were publlehed* Oermany aeoured 
the deelred 35# of Brltleh tonnage which mmournted to 
near parity in the Horth sea area* The Srltleh were 
euoeeeeful In getting the 35̂  reatrloted to a per­
centage of each warship category Instead of a etralght 
36# of all Brltleh tonna&e* Geneany aleo received 
equal parity wllAi Great Britain In the building of 
B5 
aubmarlnee* The agreement warn clearly a victory for 
Germany and a peraonal trluaqAi for Rlbbentrop* 
Rlbbentrop wae elated with hla eucoeee# In an 
Interview with the Mkncheater Guardian on June 23, 
1935, Rlbbentrop eteted* 
I believe thla naval agreement le the be* 
ginning; of a practical peace policy* It 
settle# the vital neval problem between 
Germany and Britain once and for all* from 
25 
Document» on international Affelre, 1935, 
I, 143* 
26 
Ibid*. 146̂ 47* 
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now on there will be no more naval rivalry# 
It la woncierf i l to think what it #111 mean 
for these two countries» 
Now I will aay aomethlng more# I read 
In one of yeaterdaya paper* that Germany 
haa tried to drive a wedje between PYanoe 
and Britain# Here I mnat tell you that we 
in Germany completely fall to understand 
auch queer Inalnuatlone* which aeem to w# 
ratber email talk of people who cannot 
free themeelvee from a pre-war, if net 
antediluvian* mentality. I think we all 
ought to try and be wiee and forget our 
domestic troubles in the Old world# If 
we all want the renascence of the #%st, 
as Chancellor Hltlar said In his speech, 
we must learni to think In a broader way 
and mist believe in It# 
And now, finally, you want to know what 
the next step ml̂ t be* On this 1 will wke 
a personal remark* People say I have made 
it my life task to help bring about a close 
collaboration between Britain, France and 
Germany in whlob the other European states 
would gladly join# I believe these people 
are rlé̂ ht, and I am convinced we are on 
the beet road now* 
"Rts AngloMSerman Raval %reement was a personal 
triumph for Rlbbentrop as well as for Hitler# It 
marlmd a turning point in Ribbentrop*# career, for 
Hitler now looked upon klm as a "second Bismarck#̂  
Had not Ribbentrop pulled off a brilliant diplomatic 
coup when all othere, even the most experienced 
diplomats In the foreign office, had voiced the 
opinion that It could not be done? Hitler was jubilant# 
He hnd legally broken the D̂iktat" of Versailles, for 
technically the ê rreement constituted a violation of 
that paf̂ t. The British appeared satisfied but not 
entauslastlc# They considered the agreement as a choice 
«•34» 
between two evlla# They sigaed the pact with the 
hop# that It would @md the naval rivalry between 
tbe t#o coimtrlee and with the eonvlotlon that thl# 
wa# the only way to limit Hitler*# naval %*earmament 
policy» The Rrenoh, on the other hand were unable 
to hide their bitterness at what they oonaidered a 
broken promlee and an obvious oonoe##ion to the 
German die ta ter* A# a reeiilt* a rift appeared in 
PranoofBritlah relation#, 
Altho%igh much of the credit for thl# diplomatie 
feat umdowbtedly belong# to Rlbbentropy the olroiw 
atanee# of the time oontributed greatly to making hi# 
taek eaeler* The Ifaahlngton Mkval C*nfe%*enoe #hlch 
had eetabllahed the 5«B"5-1»1 ratie for naval di#* 
armament wa# to expire the following year with ne 
Indication that it would be renewed* %»ltalm̂  there* 
fere* realizlng that the Vereallle# Treaty could me 
longer reetrlot Oermany*# naval reaneamemt program# 
wa# forced to grant oonoeaalon# to Hitler in order 
to commit him te a written agreement* Slw» alee 
realized that Hitler'# naval armament ambition# 
oon#tituted a serious threat to her naval supresmcj, 
a threat which #he regarded a* more eeriou# tbam 
the amaoyanoe of Frame®# 
So it #eemm that the condition# and elrcum#tance# 
*36— 
of the times probably had ee much to do with 
Rlbbentrop*» success in london as his own diplomatic 
ekill* B» that a# It may# the important reault of 
the Anglo-̂ Oerman Naval Agreement in reepect to 
Ribbentrop warn the high preatlge ae a diplomat that 
he gained in the eyea of Hitler and the )fa*l leader## 
It was clearly » turning point in his career and 
paved the way for more important and more re#pon@ibl# 
poeltion# to follow# 
In reviewing Ribbentrop*# life from bl# early 
year# to the beginning of hi# political career, 
oertaln aepect# of hi# peraonality* attitude#» and 
political development clearly etand out* Ribbentrop 
wa# a vain, arrogant peraon# aoclally and politically 
ambitlou#. In the etruggle to realize theae ambition#, 
h* exploited eve%*y favorable opportunity, a# the 
manner in which he ae<luired hi# title of nobility 
aptly demonatrate#» On the other hand, the## trait# 
were offaet by a winning charm, a oharm graced by 
an air of dlatinction* Above all, and in contraat 
with the other Nàtl# #ur3founding Hitler, Ribbentrop 
was a man of the world, a cosmopolitan, widely 
travelled and fluent in three language#. It wa# un*' 
doubt#dly thee# factor# which accounted, at learnt in 
part, for Ribbentrop*# rapid ri#e to Hitler*# favor* 
•36" 
To the»# qualities was added Rlbbentrop*# policy 
of never diaafreeiHg with his Fuehrer# 
Tbeee #re Important feotow In Rlbbentrop'# 
rlee to diplomatie oonaequence, but even more 
Important in relation to the event# $Ailch followed 
wae the growth of hie pronounced Anglophlllem# Thle 
fondneaa for Britain and the Brltleh people dates 
from hie echool yea re In England# where he made 
iiany iQaglleh frlende, and wae atrengthened during 
hie etay In Canada and diirlng hie commerolal aotlvltlea 
after the war. Hie auceeee In oonoludlng the Naval 




Th# A%%lo*G#rman Maval Agreement of 1935 bed 
been acceded to by the Brltieh not only la the hope 
of aetlefylng Qermeny*# rearmexeent embltlone but et 
the meme time of gaining e epeclflc end written 
llmltetlon on Germeny*# rearoiement program* But by 
March 1936* the cloud# over Europe began to aeaume 
e darker ampeet, Italy had begun to pueb her colonial 
ambltlone In Ethiopia* when on March 7 In one of hie 
many Saturday coupe Hitler announced Germany'* re-
occupation and re*milltarl%atlon of the Rhineland. 
To the Germen people* Bltlar gave the following 
1 
reaeone for hie action* 
Rpance baa Infringed on the Rhine Pact 
through e military alliance with the Soviet 
Union and In thla manner the locamo Rhine 
Pact hae loet It# Inner meaning and ceaaed 
in practice to exlet* Geirmany regard# her* 
aelf for her pert a# no longer bound by 
thl# dlaaolved treaty# 
In taking this action. Hitler insisted upon 
the fundamental right of every nation to mecure It# 
frontier# and to insure its defenee* Hitler acted 
contrary to the advice of the diplomat# In the 
Ŵagl Conspiracy _& Aggresalon, IV* 994*95# 
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foï̂ igm office #nd the w&mlnge of hie top militmiy 
leadera. Ribbentrop, on th.© other Zmnd, was practl-
o#lly alone In advielng Hitler that a more propltloue 
moment would never again preeemt iteelf* 
m the eame speech, Hitler propoaed both a 
twenty«*flve year non-aggreeelon pact among the 
weatem power* end the eetebllahment of a bilateral 
demllltariaed zone with complete parity for both 
Fifanee and Germany# Hitler aleo hinted at the po#ai* 
bility of Germany** returning to the League and of 
hi# wllllngne#* to conclude an air pact# H# mad# m 
Important reeervation, however. In that he ineieted 
upon the i*eetoration of the German colonie*, an issue 
which wa# to b* mm excellent bargaining point for the 
next few year** 
The we#tern power# were euffioiently concerned 
to convene the league Council in London to examine 
Oermany'# violation of the Locamo Pact# %ie German 
government aleo demon*trated anxiety over the eituatiom 
and through the German ambaegador in London *ugge*ted 
that Germany be invited to #end a delegate to the 
oouncil'e meeting#* %e Britiah agreed, and once 
g 
Paul Schwars, This Man Ribbentron (New Torki 
Julian Meaaneer, Inc•, 1Â5), 149# ' 
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&g»ln Jo&ohlm von Rlbb#ntrop appeared on the dlplAamtle 
eoene, thle time a» head of the Reloh*# delegation 
to the Leagtie Geuncll* the aame council from ehlch 
Germany bad bitterly withdrawn three yea re before# 
Rlbbentrop and hla delegation arrived In london 
on Maroh 18* 1936# The following day, Rlbbentpop 
delivered a twenty*flve minute apeeeh before %ie 
Cornell In which he reiterated Hitler** previous con* 
tentlone that l%&nce had broken the pact by her alliance 
with Rweela and that Gerxmny waa more than anxloiaa te 
ocme to an amicable eettlement with Pranoe# Rlbbentrop 
argued that beoaume of the PTench aotlon, Eooame had 
oeaeed to exlet* Re alee repeated Hitler̂ a new offer, 
giAaranteelnf oeace for twenty-five yeare, ae the 
Bolutlon to Burope*e problem#* 
Deeplte hie glowing epeech* whloh oame ae a 
dleeppolntment to many becanee It did not elaborate 
on Hitler*# propoaale, Rlbbentrop failed to Impreee 
hie audlenoe# That same afternoon and with little 
deliberation, the Council voted to ceneure Germany*# 
re*oocupatlon of the Rhlneland on the ground* that 
it eonetltuted a eerloue violation of the Leoamo 
4 
pact* Rlbbentrop later attributed hie failure to win 
3 
fh® lew York Time## March 2Q, 1936, p* 1# 
*Ibld.. March 20, 1936, p, 1, 
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oaa# to the f»ot that ho epoke la Gormwrn 
ana *a# therefore# perk»P* mleundeMtood# After the 
oenawe, the Cowmoll drafted * mémorandum calling for 
a demllitarl«ed atrip In the Rhlneland and requeating 
Germany to preeent her caee to the Hague Court# 
fdhbentrop then flew to Berlin to confer with 
Hitler, but returned a few day# later to Inform the 
Looamo power# that Germany rejected everything In 
the Council*» propoeala and that Germany would eoon 
come forward with a plan of her own# On April 2, 
Rlbbentrop Informed the Council In vague term» that 
(Germany propoaed not to Increaee her fbroe# In the 
Rhlneland within the next four aontha* that Belglm* 
and Praaoe ehould make elmllar pledg»#* and %iat aa 
International oommlealon ehould be appointed to eee 
$ 
that the»e promleee were earrled out* Bden promptly 
Informed Rlbbentrop that the propoeale were not enough 
and that further proof of Germany'e elnoerlty would 
have to be forthcoming# On April 10* 1936, Rlbben*» 
trop left Ixmdon with no apparent plan# to return# 
Rlbbentrop*# etay In Î xndon wa# not without mome 
reeult, however, for ae the Mew %rk Tlmee remarked# 
'̂ Ibld#. April 2, 1956, p# 1, 
Îbld.. April 4, 1936, p. 1# 
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Kltl#r kms Jomchim von Rlbbantrop *nd bl# 
other Agent# In London to thank for hastening 
Mr, Edem*8 conversion to hie present view* 
Sine# thoir arriv#! in London they hav# in­
dulged in #. o»mgp&ign of inoreaming violono#, 
donounoing to politici&na *nd influontiml 
member# of eooiety the young foreign eeoretery 
&e * htmbly #ubmle#ive to order# 
from Pari#* 
%e end reeult, therefore, of the proceeding# 
of the League Council #»# a formal ceneure of 
Germany'# action in occupying the Rhineland# But 
unforttmately the Council*# propoaed eolution# #oon 
becmm# mired in committee# and their effect wa#ted 
with the re#ult that Hitler came off with a bloodle## 
victory while the etaggerlng League received another 
devaetatiag blow* 
On April 10;, 1966, the very able German 
aadoaemador to Great Britain, Leopold von Hoeeoh, died 
#udd#aly$ Ribbentrop wa# appointed hla eucceaeor but 
not until Augu#t the game year, and he did not official* 
ly occupy hi# po#t until three months later, a mo#t 
izvegular procedure# "Biere appear to be eeveral 
reaaon# for Rlbbentrop*m reluctance to a#8ume hi# 
London a##ignment# Pir#t of all, the poeltlon of 
State Secretary had recently been vacated and Rlbben* 
trop had already expressed hi# deaire for that appoint̂  
ment* At the same time he had al#o wanted the 
opportunity of goin̂ : to London to eecure Hitler*# 
*"42" 
long-sougfefc aîllaaee with Groat Britain# Moreover, 
Neureth firmly oppoaed Rlbbentrop am State Secretary 
and threatened to realgn if Hitler confirmed It* 
Secondly, there waa the queetlon of Rlbbentropf# 
atatua while "Ambaaaador-at-Iairge" in Ixmdon, To ge 
to London aa a mere ambaagador implied, to Rlbbentrop 
at any ratê  a demotion in rank* Reurath bad alao 
objected to Rlbbentrop*# going to Wndon aa '̂ Ambaaaador* 
at'ilArge,** becauae It waa known at the time that the 
Britiah government had objected to recelvlnt̂  Ribben'» 
trop in any other atatua but amba#aador# finally, 
Seurathg in hla anxiety to be rid of Rlbbentrop and 
hi# meddleaome Buero and convinced that the miealem to 
london would fall within three month», conaented to 
a oompromiae whereby Rlbbentrop would officially go 
to lAndon aa ambaaaador but would unofficially retala 
his rank aa "Ambaasador*at*'I*rge*̂  and thue could be 
called upon by Hitler to perfoim varied and private 
dlploomtlo chorea# 
The reaction to Ribbentrop'a appointment aa 
7 
3chwara, ojg, olt#, 191*92. 
See alao* PTanz von Papen, Nemoira (Hew York# 
R* P# Dutton & Company, Inc#, 1955), 372*'76# 
See alao# Maicom Wuggeridge, Ed*, Ciano * a 
Diplomatic Paper# (Londoni Odhams Press LlmTiiST" 
Ba-66. 
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mmbaaaador varied* It Irritated moat of the 
career diplomate In the Wllhelmetraeee* News report# 
from London stated that Ike announo«neat of hi# 
apoolntmemt was received "without regret but without 
8 
enthusiasm#* The French Temp# commented that '̂he 
Is credited with an almost Machiavellian genius for 
hoodwinking the Brltleh by his good humor and person# 
ellty" and went on to #ay that the news of hi# 
arcolntment could be looked upon as a dangerous threat 
9 
to future Anglô frenoh relations* At any rate, 
Rlbbentrop*# Impending mission to London was viewed 
by many with both Interest and anxiety as to what new 
turn AnglO'̂ GeMsan relations ml̂ ht now take* 
After almost three months of wranĝ llng over 
his diplomatic statuŝ  Joaoblm von Rlbbent%*op finally 
arrived In London on October 26, 1956# TTpon hi# 
arrival end clad in the brown uniform of a Magi storm 
trooper» Rlbbentrop gave his welcomers a brisk Nael 
salute and a short speech calculated to lay the 




%ew York Times. August 12̂  1936# p# 1, 
Îbld#. August 13̂  1936, p# 8# 
^̂ Ibld#. October 27, 1936, p# 9. 
44~ 
Germmmy wnafes the fri«»dshlp of Great 
Brltela, a»d I thi#k the Bmglloh people 
#e»t Gemmm frlemdehlp# The fuehrer 1# 
ceaVlmoed thet the only real danger for 
Zurope 1# lAo further epremd of oommumlam* 
thet meet terrible of ell dl#em#e#.**#.* 
terrible becettae the people oialy feellme 
the dWimger Wiea It 1* too lete# Cloeer 
oellmboratlon between our two oouatrle# 
Im thl» #em@e is not only Importent, Wt In 
my opinion, 1# a vital neoemolty 1» o«r 
etruggle for upholding our olvlllaatlon and 
culture## I am only too willing to do every» 
thing I ean te help# 
Thl# initial apeeeh waa Intended a# a trial 
balloon, but contrary te Rlbbentrop*# expectation# 
It met with nmdh adveree reaction# Similar to other 
11 
reaponoea, waa the reply of sir Auaten ChazAerlaln̂  
publlahed %ov«aber 4 In the Dally Teleeraïah. In whloh 
he #ald$ 
If our frlendahlp be aought, let It be for 
It# own aake* Ooxmon aynpathlea* comwn 
Intereata, and a ooamon pwpeae are a more 
a table and healthier foumdatlon for frlendahlp 
than parejudloe and paaalon**#**#Ae verbal 
oonteat# ef Naal and Belahevlk are not worth 
the benea ef a Brltlah oremadier# 
^̂ CbaaAerlaln, Sir Anaten, ie9&*l»5T ̂  Civil 
&*rd of the Admiralty, IBB6, DOO* Chaneeller of gk-
Amquer, 1D0»#1»06# m,?*, lê»».lBi4# Secretary ef 
State for India# 1#1#*1$1T; Mcwber of #ar Cabinet, 
19181 Chancelier ef Acohequér, 1@1@#1»#1* leader of 
Bouae of 0#«men#, litl*19iS| Seoratary ef State for 
Foreign Affair#, 1984*19W; Rrat Lord ef the 
Admiralty, 1931* Ohanoeller of Reading imlveralty# 
19S5-193T# 
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Schwarz, og# olt#. 800# 
Shu.a it S9©!MS thmt Rlbbentrop*# rather ostentatious 
beginning in Ix)n(lon failed to strike the harmonlou# 
chord he Imd anticipated# 
TNhat, therefore* «ae the real aim of the Rlbben* 
trop Mission to Londoaf Sa answering this question, 
one muet rely heavily upon Rlbbentrop'e post-war 
teetlmony and the teetlmonlea of hie contemporarlea* 
At Xfuremberf, Rlbbentrop teatlfled that he pereuaded 
Hitler to eend him to London with the hope of bringing 
home an alliance with Oreat Britain. Se further 
teatlfled that a Brltleh alllanoe had been an Ide# 
f̂  ̂with Hitler for eome time and that the Fuehrer 
felt confident that It oould be achieved at thle 
13 
time. 
Granted that both Hitler and Rlbbentrop deelMd 
an alllanoe with Britain* what form wae thl# alliance 
to tak# and what warn Rlbbentrop̂ # attitude toward 
%%land at the time that he took up hi# poet a# 
ambaaeadort fbr purpoae# of under#tending the Rlbben-
13 
International Military Tribunal# l̂al of 
Major War Qrlminal# Before the late ma t ioaa'l' WITitarT 
ïRrl1)ùnaï Nuremberg. 14 *ove3̂ r 1945 # 1 Ocfober 
.""ÏZxtVï. f#ur#mGe"'"̂ lïeM&atlonal"ifilitary 
WIEunal, 1947.1949), X, 836.59# 
Pee al#o* 0. M# Gilbert, MurezAerg Diary Clew 
Torkl Rmrrar, Straus, 1947), 830# 
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trop mission and its eventual failure amd Rlbben* 
trop*a changed attitude and the effect of this change 
on Hitler*# deolelone, tbeee are Important queetlone. 
Judging from Rlbbentropfe epeech at Victoria Station, 
one could aeeume that th» real aim of his mission was 
the alignment of Britain with Germany agalnmt Rue#la* 
m this manner Britain could be neutralized̂  and 
Sltler could pureue hla policies In central and 
eastern Europe unmoleated* Rlbbentrop told Win#ton 
14 
Churchill In 1937 that the term# of this alliance 
would almply be# a permanent Anglo-Oerman naval parity 
agreement along the line# of the 1935 agreement; a 
joint guarantee of the low countrlea; and a provlelon 
that Germany would a&ree to guarantee the eolldarity 
of the British Empire, %r her pert̂ , Britain would 
recognlee Germany ae a atrong power in Europe and not 
Churchill* Rt# Hon, Wlnaton I#onard Spencer * 
Britlah writer and Coneervatlve Party leader wbo wa# 
preeident of the Board of Trade» 1908*1910; Home 
Secretary, 1910-1911; Flrat Lord of the Admiralty, 
1911*1916; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaeter, 1915; 
Mlnlater of Munltiona, 1917; Secretary of State for 
#ar, 1918"19S1; for Alr,1918""1901; for the colonie#, 
1921«,Bg|̂  Chancellor of the EKChequer, 1924*1929; Plrat 
Lord of the Admiralty, 1930*1940; frim* Minister, 
First Lord of the Treaeury, and Minister of Defease, 
1940̂ 1945; WK# defeated and became oppoeitlon leader, 
1946; re-elected Prime Mini#tor, 1960; retired, 1956, 
See also# Seabury, og. oit#, 56. 
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Interfere In Hitler* a policies In eaatsm and centre1 
15 
Europe* The eeaence of tble hoped»for elllmnee 
eeema to have been merely #n ettempt to noutrellze 
Britain end thue gain for Germany freedom of action 
In eaetem BuM)p#, 
A« to Rlbbentrop'e current attitude toward 
Britain, there eeema to be little doubt that he warn 
«till extremely fbnd of England and the Rnglleh people 
Partial proof of thle wae eupplled In eome detail In 
the preceding chapter* furWier evidence has been 
brought to light In the post*war memoir# of Herbert 
16 17 
von MLrkeen and Count Clano# Dliicean̂  who later 
replaced Rlbbentrop a# ambaaeador to Britain, In #%* 
preaelng hi# eurprlee at the failure of Rlbbentrop*# 
ml##lon* atated that #ien Rlbbentrop left for England 
he m»̂ # p̂ro"Brltl#h to a degree boirderlng om anobbery# 
Ŵlnaton S* ChuMhlll* gathering Ptorm (Boaton 
Houghton Mifflin Ce.» 1948)$ 822.25. ' 
16 
Dlrkaen, Herbert von German Ambaaaador to 
Soviet Dhlon, 1929-1933f Ambaeaador to Japan̂  1933# 
1938# Ambaaaador to Great Britain (aucoeedlng Rlbben­
trop), 1938*1939# Reelgned from German foreign office 
1939. 
^̂ Clano dl Cortellatao, Count Galeateo, Italian 
Foreign Wlnlater, 1936*1943, Mu##ollnl*a aon#ln*law$ 
executed by the Ramla # 1943* 
18 
Herbert von Dlrkaen, Moaoo*, Tokyo, pô on 
{ #onsan; TMlveralty of Oklahoma ï̂ 'î s'a, IfSsI, 
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CiaïiO in bis motea that la a. eonveramtloa be* 
t#«#n himself and von Beurath the latter explained 
Bltlerfa reloctaaee to believe in Britain## policy 
of encirclement toward# Germany aa *&ue to the work of 
Rlbbentrop, who every so often attempts to inject 
19 
Anglophile optlmlam into the Fuehrer,* The date of 
thi# convereatlon correepond# closely to Ribbentrop*# 
arrival in london and lead# one to conlade that at 
the outset Rlbbentrop waa unmietakably m thoroughgoi** 
Anglophile# The reversal of thi# attitude during the 
twilight months of Rlbbentrop'a ambasBadorsblp was 
later to have significant effect# on Kltler*# decision* 
while Ribbentrop wns foreign minister* 
At the beginning of hi# mission, Ribbentrop 
attempted to ease the difficulty of his task by per* 
suadlng the German press and propaganda ministry to 
reduce the vigor of their campaign# for the restoratiom 
of the Germa* colonies, Rlbbentrop knew that the 
Brltieh government considered these repetitious and 
unw#lcom* attack* on the British Bnplre a #erlou* 
Impediment to closer relation# between the two countrle#* 
Although suoce#sful in reducing this source of 
friction, Ribbentrop nevertheless caused him#elf many 
19 
MUggeridge, ©£« clt*. 59*60# 
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petty difficulties during the flret period of hla 
stay In Londoa* The first of hie troubles started 
when be made his arrival speech on the danger of 
bolshevlsm* This led to Plr Austen Chamberlain** 
retort which has already been meatloaed* but a further 
repercussion was found enacrlbed on the walls and 
sidewalks of London to the effect that "Rlbbentrop 
80 
must go** At the same time, people were being arrested 
throughout London for throwing brick* through the 
German embassy*# wladowe and shouting defamatory re* 
21 
mark# about Rlbbentrop* 
Ribbeatrop*# speech on bolshevlsm also produced 
a reaction in the House of Common#* The Communist 
#*P,, William Qallaoher* caused a stir when he arose 
and said "Rlbbentrop comes to Bagland with hand# red 
with murder#* demaodimg that the newly arrived am* 
22 
bassador be driven from the country* Rlbbentrop 
complained bitterly to Bden about this criticism tn 
the House of Commonŝ  thus setting some sort of a 
precedent for complaining about the utterances of a 
member of Parliament, somethln&i as Baen explained to 
Pibtontrop, over which the Government had no control* 
pm 
Btw York Times. November 7̂  1936, p# ?, 
^̂ Ibid.. November 7, 19&6, p. 7* 
2*Ibld., October SO, 1936, p, 2, 
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a*#plt# theme &mtl*Rlbbeatrep demoa* 
etretloa*, be eontlaaed to meke uatectftal remerka 
that bolehevlem «** the eommoa eaemy of both eeuatrle## 
The situation finally reached sweh a poiat as te foree 
Edea officl&lly to Inform Rlbbeatrop tbet *tbe Brltleh 
goverameat refuses to a ha re the Germea view of the 
% 
neoeealty of an *ati*cemmunlat oruaede," 
Theee lacldeat* ere ualmportaat eloagalde the 
more elgalflceat heppealnge la European dlplomaer at 
the time tut are related here to demoaetrate the ua* 
favorable olreumetaacee uader which the Rlbbeatrop 
mleeloa to loadoa *ae oomdaeted. These, and elmllar 
Incidente ehleh took place later, all had their effeot 
on the Brltleh gevernment and pwblle and eentrlbuted 
la eome degree to the eldealng of the gulf whloh 
eeparated Britain and Germany* But alnee a consider* 
atlo* of the effect# of Rlbbeatrop and hla mieeloa 
upoa the Brltleh public le beyond the acope of thl# 
- project theme email Incldeata are brought to ll̂ ht a# 
llluetretloae of the origin* of Plbbentrop*# later 
Anglophobia* 
Not ell of Rlbbeatrop*# early aoeompllahmeata 
were recorded la red In the diplomatic ledger# for he 
Ibid*. November 21, 1936, p* 1# 
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managed to score at least three early sucoeaeee# Aie 
first, which could hardly be described as a major 
diplomatie feat, waa to arrange for the exchange of 
%ie London fbllarmonlc Orcheatra and the Dreaden Opera 
24 
Company between London and Berlin# The eeoond and 
more algnal success waa registered when Rlbbentrop 
negotiated a naval agreement In lAilch Qermany agreed 
to accept certain limitation# on eiAmaarlne warfare 
which had been adopted by the Weetem fowera at the 
London Naval Conference of 1930* 
The third and mo@t crowning auocea# of thla 
early period wae Rlbbentrop*a negotiating and algnlng 
of the inti-Comlntem Pact in lR)vember 1956 between 
(Germany and Jkpan* The pact itself wae not a military 
alliance ae many auepect̂ Wl at the tlm# but merely a 
joint declaration on the part of the two countrlee 
concerned to work together In combating the devlllah 
work of the Comintern* Bnt Ite effect amounted to a 
detente between Oermany and Japan# Ihe whole affair 
24 
Ibid## November 15, 1956* p« 1# 
26 
Frederick L* Schuman# Europe On The Ev# (Mew 
lOrki Alfred A* Knopf# 1942)# 246»46# 
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wmm an unumual piece of diplomacy* alRce It wa# 
accompliahed without the participation of the Oenaan 
foreign office and becâ ae the German algxmtory wae 
not the German foreign mlnleter but the German am-
baaeador In Ix)ndon, %e%rath told hi# po#t*war Inter" 
rogator# that he refueed to #lgn the pact beca%#e he 
regarded It a# a dangerou# policy for Germany and be" 
cause it would only eucceed In driving China further 
into the arm# of commnlam* Deeoylblng Rlbbentrop'# 
#l0&lng of the pact a# **# moat imueual procedure#" 
Meurath went on to #ay that Rlbbentrop ehould have 
minded hi# own bualne## in thl# matter but Inetead 
went out of hi# way to give the Brltlah a deliberate 
elap In the face by algnlng the paot while he wa# 
ambaaaador there* Naturally the Brltlah had no use 
26 
for hi* after that#* 
Rlbbentrop wa# alao aucceeefbl In hi# aotlvltle# 
a# a memOaer of the *on"Zaterventlon Committee which bad 
been eatabllshed ahortl̂  after the outbreak of the 
Spmlah Civil War in 1936# It wa# #upported by twenty* 
#even European countrle# for the purpose of applying 
B6 
Gilbert̂  op# clt*# 225"26# 
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m policy of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict, 
ïhle memnt essentially an attempt to prohibit the 
flow of arma and foreign volunteera into Spain, When 
Blbbeatrop took his place on the Committee, it *aa 
hoped in London that h@ would boost its effectiveness -
since Ribbentrop after all was close to Hitler, But 
from the veî r beginning, Ribbentrop thwarted the 
ooammnieta at every turn and time after time threw the 
committee into deadlock and taactloa* 
Rlbbentrop used the Committee a* a #o%nding board 
for vehement attack* on the Soviet Union aa well aa to 
inhibit ̂ e Committee** efforts to atop the flow of 
fighting men from Qezwany into Spain* On October 50, 
1957, Rlbbentrop delivered a apeech before the Coamltte# 
lAiich virtually wired away all previous propoaala advanced 
27 
to aolve the non-intervention problem, 
%roia@kiiont the entire conrse of the prooeedlnga of 
the llTon̂ Intervention Committee, Britain and Prance ahowed 
a vacillating and aometime# compromialng attitude, Therê  
fore, it la quite poaalble that Rlbbentrop'a experience* 
aa a member of the Committee constitute one of the vital 
links in the formation of his belief that Britain was 
27 
lew York Tlmea, October 51, 1957, p, 9, 
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deomdent *nd reluctmnt to go to w»r, mm opinion l#t#f 
to pl*y so Important & part In the Austrian, C&eoh, 
and Pollmh oris**# Even at thla time, artlclee 
appeared In the Brltleh prege contending that Elbhem* 
trop wae advlelng Hitler that the Brltleh public would 
not tolerate military action agalnat Germany under 
28 
any olrcumatanoea# 
% return to the chronology of the mleelon̂  
Rlbbentrop returned to London In f\»bruary 1957 after 
ependlng w extended holiday vacation In Berlin* Ihe 
London atmoeptiere upon hla return #ae leas favorable 
to an Anglo-Qerman underetandlng than upon hie departure* 
The new Brltlah coolneea wae due In pert to Hitler*# 
recent #p$eeh In the Relchatag In which he eg&lm 
attacked the "̂ Diktat** of Vereallle# and the loe# of 
the Germen colonie#* Another eomewhat minor factor 
wa# the work currently being conducted on th$ German 
eaAaaey in lAndon# !îhe embaasy w$# ewamalng; with 
woiinmen engaged In a va#t remodeling project aimed at 
making It the moat lavlah modal center In %/»ndon and 
at the earn# time ma outward algn that Germany wanted 
clo#e relation# with Britain, Although hi# intention* 
were no doubt good, thl# wa# but anothar Inatanc# In 
28 
Ibid*. November 28, 1956* p# 1* 
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which Rlhbemtrop*# aohemlng worked out in reverse# 
Over half the workmen bad been Imported from Germany; 
they were beinf; houeed la extrê moomforteble quarte$*8, 
paid e gOod eelery which wee aeat home to their 
famille*, and In addition given an expense aocount In 
excess of the amoimt paid British workmen# Rpom 
London laboring groupe# currently eixfferlng from 
depression and unemployment* and from labourites In 
Commene came loud protests beoauee British workmen were 
29 
not used# Shis public reaetlon, however* did not 
prevent Rlbbentrop from speeding up the work to ready 
the embassy for his lavish coronation reception in 
the spring# 
throughout this same month, Rlbbentrop*# lll'̂  
luok continued to plague him# It was on $%bfuary 4, 
that be committed one of his worst blunders# Th# 
oeoaslon was the oourt reception In which King Geot%# 
VI received the heads of the dlplematic legations ïbr 
purposes of accepting their credentials. During this 
selesA procedure# it was customary for the diplomats# 
escorted by the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, to 
89 
Ibid*. Bsbryary 4, 1937# p# 6# 
^̂ Ibid*. May 16# 1937# p. 3. 
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@lowly in & aorio* of bowa toward tbo king, 
présent their credentiale, bow a%ain and aedately 
retire# Ribbentrop* however, in full evening dre##, 
aaw fit ta depart from the eatabliehed procedure# Ik 
advanced briakly# completely outdietancing hie eeoort, 
halted aharply before the British monarch, olioked hi# 
heele# and gave the kin̂ f the Bitlerian ealute# H# 
then forcefully ehook the king*# hand$ preeented hi# 
credentiale, retired a abort diatanoe and rendered 
another aalute* Aeoording to eye witneaa reporta, the 
king although taking the matter calmly, amiled eome* 
81 
what laneaaily* It ia difficult to explain why Pibben#* 
trop put on thle untactful exhibition, but it ie 
likely that he deliberately meant to affront the 
country to which he wae accredited# Rather, it aemm# 
certain that the future German foreign mlnleter meant 
te deeonetrete forcefully the trlrnqph of the National 
Soclallat Revolution » without realising the reaction 
it would create. It la, of oouree, a striking meaaure 
of hla ineptitude aa a diplomat, and the wide publiol#" 
ty it received in the preaa oonatituted another link 
in the aeriee of Incidente contributing to Rlbbentrop## 
growing bitteineaa toward Britain, After ell, no on* 
Si 
Ibid#, February 6, 1957, p. 1* 
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CAR be more bitter than a "̂ nleunderatood" man* 
From the very beginning of his mission, Rlbbem* 
trop b*d unauocemsfully bomberded the Brltleh foreign 
offloe with reqizeat# to t&k* up the leeu# of Oermmny*# 
loet oolonle#* On piebru#iry 11# 1937, b* took »dv#intaig# 
of the fact that Ed#n ### on a holiday to confer #l@a 
30 
Lord Ballfax on the colonial problem* Much to hi# 
aurprlae he received a a tiff rebuff and was told that 
Oreat Britain could not recognize Qermany*$ colonial 
clalme or her repudiation of the Vermalllea Treaty. 
Ten da;* later, gden gave him the eame anewer$ aecompa"» 
nled by a proteet over Germany's failure to anewer the 
Britlah qixeatlonnalre of the preceding November# But 
Rlbbentrop̂  In a apeech at Leipzig on March 1» refueed 
to refrain from hie loud claim# for Germanŷ e colonie# 
aad aeverely denounced the country to which he *a# 
accredited for refualag to settle the question ef 
Germany*# "#tolen colonie##* "Zbe #peech wa# lll-re# 
oelved la London aad aectlon# of the Britlah pre## 
3B 
Halifax̂  Earl of (Edeard Frederick Llndley 
Wood) - British Secretary of State for Pbreign Affair#, 
1938*1940; Ambassador in Washington, 1941-1946# At 
the time of hie Interview with Rlbbentrop, Halifax wa# 
under Secretary of State for P»relgn Affair#, 
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33 
described It a# "very lll*tlmed#" 
A fe* dmye later, Rlbbentrop'e vanity aad Anglo-
pblll#* suffered another bio*. In a gesture of friend­
ship, Ribbentrop personally presented a moniasental 
historical collection of B@00 volumes to loadon Uhlversl* 
ty. But when he sirrlved on the campus to make tlie 
presentation, he was greeted with boos, catcalls, and 
54 
jeers from demonstrating students. Since this Incident 
was the first time within recent memory that a foreign 
envoy had been jeered at In the streets of London, it 
served to inform Rlbbentrop of Britain̂ s growing antl* 
ITasl attitude and to Increase his bitterness and 
hatred toward England* 
Yet, by Qie summer of 1937 and despite Rlbben* 
trop*s obvious failures, hope had not been abandoned 
by the two gevemments of reaching and understanding* 
Ernst von #elssacker, the state Secretary, stated in 
that the foreign office felt that the 
relations between the two countries oould be Improved 
by a step̂ 'bŷ step process, the first step of which 
was to have been a visit of Reu]?ath to London In Jim# 
*̂Ibid.. March 17, 1937, p. 16. 
^̂ Welssacker, Brnst, Baron von. Bead of the 
Political Depax'tment of the German Foreign Ministry, 
August 1936*March 193B; State Secretary, April 1, 
l»38~Aprll 1943. 
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1959# the i#m# to hav# 
b«@m o@»e«m#d with the peealbllltlee of ei*»atimg 
» miltllmter*! »eeterm pmet &ad with the eettlmg up 
of & bipartite committee to reeolve the colomlel 
laen** Bixt em th# eve of Ruerath*» <l*partur*. Hitler 
eamoelled the vialt* The reaeom# Bitler gave #ere 
exceedingly weak, mmd it aewae apparent from th# 
Cla*o Pape»* that Qie real rwuwm #ae Italy*» fear 
leet the vlalt weakem the fWme*Berllm Axle# Clam# 
himeelf eta ted that he ooQld aee R# neeftil purpoae 
5? 
to be aerved by Meixratĥ g gol*g te I<»adomi* #iat th# 
%e%rath vlalt would have produced had it oceared im-
vitee lmt#re#tl»g epeoulatiom* byt aoeordlnf: to later 
38 
observera, 31r Kevill# Hemdereom for oae, the eancel̂  
latiea wa# m##t u*fortu«%te i% that it came at a time 
#i#m oomditî m# eeemed favorable for poachimg a» 
imder# tamdimg* 
Oa the other hamd# AmglewOermam relatione fared 
b*tter oomoe%*lag maval matter#* la July 19&?, th# 
two ooumtrlM #ig*#d a maval agreement extemdimg th# 
98 
Ermet vo* ̂ êitamoker, Memelre. tr$me* Johm 
Amdrewe (Ohloag## Eemry Regaery b#*, l#51), 112# 
57 
Muggeridg#» jgg* ô t.. 033*04# 
*̂ #md#r#om$ Sir %#vll# * Britleh Kimlater t# 
TAigeélavla, 1909#1B5@$ Ambaeaador to Germamy, 1057» 
1050j dl#df 1948. 
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provlaloa# of the 1936 mivml mgreement to the rival 
Baltic umvml powers# It also restricted the aime 
aad gun caliber cf «arahlpe» %e agreement wae hailed 
in aermamy ae proof that the Reich deeired peace, 
#̂ le im Lemdom it we regarded ae being better tham 
notblmg# 
Daring the e%mmer moniai#* efforte were comtimned 
to bring b̂e leadere of both coomtrle# to a comferemee 
table, and finally in Kovemdser 1937 I*rd EaliAuc 
vialted Berlin to confer directly with Bltler* Im 
the oouree of the oonvereatiomej, Bitler reiterated hie 
objections to the Veraailla* treaty and infomed 
Halifax that mo agreement mam poeeible except on a 
baaim of eqimlity and reality# He argued that the 
colonial q%eetiom wae mo# the malm aource of frictlom 
betweem Germany amd Brltalm, imeiatlmĝ  however, ̂ ùat 
this zAtter ebould be mettled bilaterally* Halifax, 
mhoae mood mm# appeaeimf;# told Hitler that the et# tu# 
quo im Europe did mot meceeaarily have to be maintained 
amd that a colonial aolutlom could be reached mere it 
done im a multilateral conferemoe* %ie oomveraatlon# 
concluded with Halifax*# e%pre##ed hope that other 
convereatiom# would folio# im the near future and with 
Hitler'# reaeeertion of hi# dietruet of democratic 
proceaae# and #tatememt that he would pursue the 
•61* 
colonial mattar tbrotî ji diplomatic ohannala, pra* 
@9 
ammebly via Rlbbentrop in London. 
AlthOM̂ h tha convermationa pro&uced nothing 
aanaatlonal or ooncrata, they ware raf̂ rdad aa 
aatlafactory# It warn olaar that Oraat Britain wa# 
willing to maka concaaaiona on tha colonial iaawa* 
Tha rub cama whan Hitler objactad to these laayaa 
balng aolvad by a ganaral agreamant# It la avldant 
fr<Mi tha Racrat Confaranca on Gorman foralgn policy 
which Rltlar hald juat prior to tha Halifax vlalt that 
Ritlar waa convinced that Britain woiild not oartlclpata 
40 
in a war on tha continent# Thla la «bat Rlbbantrop 
had baan telling Hitler for aome tima, and Hallfax'a 
compromlaing and conciliatory attltwle further con* 
vlnced both Hltlar and gibbantrop of tha oorrectneea 
of their via**# 
Halifax in London later told Rlbbentrop that 
Prltain waa willing to ma&$ concaaalona on tha colonial 
l$mua but that the British peoola expected aometblng in 
41 
return, namely, a limitation on Germany*a rearmament* 
Ûblted State#. Department of State, Dooument# 
on German %relgn Policy 1918-1945, Sorlaa D, V. 
Govornsaat Priafcimg Office* 
194$), I, 6M7# 
N̂mzl ConaplracT ̂  Amkreaalo*. Ill, 296*505* 
^̂ iDocumenta OB. Oermam Porel̂  Policy. I, 124-28# 
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Ribbeatrop told the thing by Neville 
40 
Chamberlain# Rpom both oonvereatlome# Rlbbemtrop 
concluded that the t#o men viewed aubaequent negoti­
ation* with conelderable ekeptlolam and that Great 
Britain would be extremely reluctant to go to war 
46 
over any continental laenee* 
By the end of 1937̂  Rlbbentrop wa# convinced 
that hie mleelon had failed and that hie earlier 
adml%*atlon of the Brltlah people had been a mletake# 
Thla changed attltnde waa clearly evidenced In a 
lengthy Kemorandim he wrote to Rltler In January 19584 
Di thla document̂  which contributed to hie conviction 
at Nuremberg# he advlaed Bltler that Britain waa 
b̂ Ailnd in her armament# and waa atalllng for time* 
Be argued that the Brltlah government had not really 
Intended to uae the Halifax viait to aeek an under* 
atandlng with Germany# and he concluded %&at Britain 
would not go te war* Germany conaequently ahouid 
follow a policy of outwardly trying to further an 
underatending, with her but ehould aecretly build up 
an antl*Brltieh coalition* mainly witk Italy and 
^̂ Ibld*. 131̂ 34# 
^̂ Ibld̂  ̂86*87* 
44 
Japan# Rlbbentrop warn convinced, owing to the 
blttemees with which he had com# to view Britain̂  
that further attempt* at reaehlng en umderetandlng 
with the "Intolerable Brltlah" would be futile, 
Rlbbemtropf* changed attitude became doubly 
Important when It was ennounced on fbbruary 4, 1938 
that* In the mldmt of a vaet cabinet and military 
ahakeupg he had been appointed to ancceed von Reurath 
a# foreign mlnleter. Important becanee he regarded a 
peaceful eolutlon of Europe*a probleme with peealmlmm, 
Ribbentrop*e hatred and antl«Brltl#h attitude were 
net to #how their full effect# until a year and one-
half later when Hitler we# Influenced by hi# calamltou# 
advice during the folleh crlel## 
!Riere 1# no doubt that Rlbbentrop*# mleelon wa# 
a failure, but why It failed 1# not #o clear* Did 1% 
%*eeult from Rlbbentrop*# Incompetence a# a diplomats 
Sir Mevlle Eendereon* who had placed much faith in Mie 
propoeed Xeurath vlelt to lAndon and who con#l#tently 
blamed Rlbbentrop a# a contributing force In the 




*̂ Nevlle Benderaon, M&llure Of â Mission (Hew 
York: G* P# Putnam̂ s Son#, W4Ù}̂  
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visit of Ne«ir«thfs had never appealed 
to Ribbeatrop beeauee Ribbentrop, in addition 
to bis lAAdon poet* #aa AmAaeaador-at̂ Large» 
and felt that We%rath*e visit would be detrir 
mental to his o#n prestige and wounding to 
his personal vanity# I feel that he did hi# 
utmost to dissuade his Wkster from agreeing 
to taie course proposed by his Majesty's Oovem» 
ment# The notorious failure of his mission 
was alrsady rankling, and it was Intolerable 
that another should come to show up the 
personal cause of that failure. History »111 
assuredly at̂ ibute a lerge share of the 
blame for September 1920 to Rlbbentrop# 
46 
At another point Henderson remazted* 
Rpom the very beginning, I felt that hi# vanity, 
hie resentment#* and his misoonceptions of England 
and gkglish mentality were a serious bar to any 
prospect of a better understanding between the 
two eountries* 
Ribbentrop hiisself, however* attributed the 
cause of his failure to olrcumstances and attitWes 
on the part of the British government over which he 
had no control* Se stated to his post«"war interre* 
47 
gators: 
Very often in my work on the Non*Intervention 
Committee* I was obliged to take a stand against 
the British* which was very unfortunate and 
which* during my ehole stay In london* inter* 
rupted very much of my real work* iihioh was* 
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Commenting upon the polltloel situation in Britain 
as a deterrent to en Aaglo-Germen alllenoe, Rlbben* 
48 
trop went on to smji 
In the year 1937, lAien I wee In I,ondon, 
I a&w that two clearly different trend# 
were gradually fomalng In Bnglandf the 
one trend #a# very much in favor of promoting 
good relatione #lth (Germany; the eeoond trend 
did not *leh much cloee relation## There 
were * I believe I do not need to mention 
name## for they are well known * the## gentle* 
men who did not wl#h aueh oleme relation# 
with Germany, Mr# #ln#ton Churchill, who wn# 
Inter prim# mlnleter, and other## 
A# another factor for the failure of hi# ml##Ion, 
Rlbbentrop malntnlned that beoRwa# of her conception 
of the balano# of power Britain wa# reluctant to 
enter into an alliance with Oermany* 2a thl#, Rlbben* 
trop claimed, he dl##gre#d vlgoroualy with Hitler 
who regarded the Iden of the balance of power a# old 
4» 
fa#hloned$ 
There are al#o the#* who argue that th# eoo* 
nomlc l##ue wa# the dominant force which kept Britain 
and Germany npart during thl# period* But a detailed 
account of thle and other factor#, although laqportant 
and no doubt significant, are neverthele## beyond 
the llaltatioaa of this paper# Suffice it to eay. 
48 
Trial of Major Mar Criminal#. X, 238*59. 
40 
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therefore, that all the*# factors cornstitutôd a 
blend In contributing to Rlbbentrop** London 
failure* 
There are, moreover, other more Important 
factors to consider In evaluating the Rlbbentrop 
Mleelon to London# Plret of *11, Rlbbentrop came to 
iXM&don an Anglophile and left an Anglophobe# #hyT 
Thle abrupt change of heart can flrat of all be 
traoed to the fact that hie mlaalon wa# a dleappolnt-
ment# Be had failed In what he bad eet out to de# 
to eecur* an alllanoe with Britain along the line# 
deelred by Kltler# %il#, added to tlie faot that hi# 
pride and vanity were Injured by Brltleh reaction# 
to hi# diplomatic alejndgement#, produced a bitter-» 
nee# and hatred toward the country he had once regarded 
a# a *#econd home#* 
Secondly, whet wa# Bibbentrop## attitude toward 
Britain at the end of hi# mieelonT Rlbbentrop had 
come to view Britain e# a weak, cowardly country* 
lAoee empire wi# fast becoming decadent and who## 
people were unwilling to go to war* Ee had been 
led to these conclueion# by Britain*# vacillating 
action# In the Non-intervention Ooumlttee, the 
conciliatory and appea#ing policie# of Qhaniberlai* 
*67-
and HmllfmXf and hie own conception of Britain*# 
atate of preparedaeaa. It *aa on the baala of 
theae oonolualona that Rlbbentrop began to advise 
Hitler that he could wreak hla will In Europe 
50 
without fear of Brltlah Intervention, advice which 
finally bore Its tragic fruit when Hitler Aeelded 
to Invade Poland# 
60 
Pepen, elt,. 376. 
CHAPTER IV 
mtOM VIENM TO PRAGUE 
Rlbbeatrop m##umed the dutl## of Oommm 
forelgm minister *t a critical poimt la Eupop#** 
politics# During the court® of the next twelve 
mon the, from March 1958 to Merch 1959, the vorld 
eritneeeed euch hietorlo event* ae the Ameohluee. th# 
Xhmioh Oomf#r#nce, and the liquidation of Caeohoel#'# 
vakia* fo the foreign offle# Ribhentrep broû t 
hie recently acquired Anglophobia and conviction# 
Wtat Great Britain #a# a weWc# decadent country# 
led by a government that would avoid war at any coat* 
Throughout thie period Ribbentrop etood a# the man 
next to Hitler* hie cleeeet confidant# Oem##quently 
during the eneuing crimiê  Hitler took Rlbbentrop*# 
advic# m#M and mere Into account in ahaping hi# 
territorial policioa* Ih #ach inetance, a# Rlbban-
trop*# advic# proved correct̂  ̂Hitler became in-
creaelngly convinced that hie foreign mini# ter* e 
judgement of Britain and the western power# wne 




Ribbentrop entered the foreign office when 
the Reme-Berlln Axle wee growing etronger and the 
polioiee of Great Britain were becoming mor# 
appeaelng* Chamberlain wae atill convinced that 
appeaeement held the key to world peace, and the 
world was not yet aware that the Sa»! appetite for 
territory wae Inaatlable* 
Although Eltler publicly praleed Rlbbeatrop, 
othere did not hold the new foreign mlnleter In 
aneh lo'fty regard# Von *e%irath, Rlbbentrop*» pre* 
deceeeor, expreeelng #i:rpyl*<» Rlbbentrop̂ e 
appointment, explained Hitler** choice aa a reeult 
of the Fuehrer*# dee ire to be aurrownded by *yee mem 
2 
Rpeneolê kponoet, Rpench aWwiapador to Berlin# wrote 
g 
even more dlmparaglngly: 
CowDlracT & AFj%reealon. Stipp* B$, 14*1 
2 PraDC0l8'»P0ncet, Andre, French Ambaasador In 
Germany, 1931̂ 1958; Ainbaamador In Italy, 1938-1940# 
Ândre Rmncolê 'poncet, %ie fateful YeaM. 
trane. Jacqwe# I,eClereq, (Rew Ybric* Bî ee* 
1949), 255.54, 
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me# Mlmlater for A»r#igm w«« 
aeithep pp®i»r»d mr flttw fer M# offle#* 
Cultwr*lly mad h* #*# 
m#dioor## E%« Igmemme# of hl#torle#l «md 
dlplom&ti« ### prodltiew#. Hi# 
*l##lAm ## Àak####d#r to lA#d#m peeved # 
y###Tmdl»g f#llur#) hi# p#%#(m#l #pit# »t 
thi# ### t® f#l#lfy hi# #v#ry jw$g##m$ #f 
@r*#t Britmim*# m#t#ri#l #md m#f#I rmonmrn* 
%im# th#m ### the mmm ôf #bom Bitl#r ##ld, 
## he ##gg#d hi# bead admlrlmgly# 'km i# 
#m#rt#r th#* Bi###reW * S%#h mn #pp#llimg 
eyror prove# bo# blind the Pwehrer ### te 
mmm ##d event# #t #e very #o##at he ### 
#bo#t to embeyk wpen the r##h##t of imdey» 
t»klR$## Truly thl# Ribbe#trop# ebee he 
l##ded te the #kie## ### te em»roi#e upem 
hi# the #e#t @om#t#*tly Aef#rio%# i&flw«M»oe# 
Deeplte re#etiom# of thi# ki»d to hi# eppeimt* 
m##t* RlbbwBtfop meveHAelee# to<* %xp hi# t##k #ith 
#othorlty #md d#teM#lm#ti##* Be #m# rwolved to 
geim beck fer the #l^U»elm#tr###e #e#e of the 
preetige #ed premiaemoe th#t km hed beeR# heretefeye* 
#o iMtFime*tmi im rednejmg# B# ### el*e wwioim# te 
«(oavert th# ##reer diplomet# vholeheertedly to the 
%#tiomel 3o#iell#t Revelwtio»# A# illu#tfetiem# ef 
hi# method, Rlbbemtrop o* eeeeeiem *##embled hi# 
diplemmt# im milltery f##hiom im th# eowrtymrd #md 
p###ed im revie#* eelutim^ eeeh im tuwt# Alee by 
Blbhe»trop*s oommmmd, the bl#@k •republl^m* froek 
mmtf eu#torn#ry ûm»» for po#t World #»r I Oerm*m 
diplomet#* ##e di##eFded im fevor of # drnA blme 
imiform, complete with gold Wttom#* mrm in#lgmi#* 
~71~ 
oak-leaf clusters and dagger* The new foreign 
mlnlater, bowever, wae never entirely euooaaeful 
In makln# ardent Nazi# out of the Wllbalmatraaaa 
diplomate, who himorouely referred to themaelve# a# 
4 
"man behind foliage** 
Rlbbentrop was In the foreign office less than 
a month whan he flew to lAndon to wind np hie affair# 
ae ambaeeador# He arrived there on %kroh 10, 19%, 
at a time when clrcumatamoe# In Brltlmh politic# 
were conaldered favorable for an Anglo*Qer%aan under* 
etanding* Great Britain wanted to avoid w#r am long 
a# poaalble and #lnce the general eleotlon# were dye 
In the fall, the Conservative leader# felt that an 
agreemant with Germany would win more vote# than th# 
lea# appeaelng pollcle# of Sden# And finally. Great 
Britain wlehed. In the event war ehould eoaw, to b# 
In a poeltlon to aay to her dominion# and potential 
aille# that every po##lble meana had been exhauatad 
6 
to prevent It# 
Paul Seabury, %be Wllhelmatraaae (Berkley! 
Uhlvorelty of CalifornTa'":î Wss , ' 19Ki ), S2• 
6 
Maw York Tlmea. March 9, 1958, p. 1. 
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Rlbbentrop, however, did not appear willing 
to exploit this favorable situation# His attitude 
wae eool a* he presented five rather hmreh demand# 
to the Brltleh government# In #%mma%7 they weipe* 
i X )  Reetralnt of the British press In its attacks 
on Nazi Germany, (2) recognition of Gkginaany*# 
colonial claim# without the colonial queetion forming 
the baelB of a general agreement, (5) Brltlah 
aemzrance of non#lnterventlon in the affair* between 
Berlin and Romê  ̂(4) Brltleh eygqpathy for Oerman# 
living outelde the Third Relah, and (5) recognition 
of Oermany*# right to defend hereelf agalnet 
6 
Boletŵ viem# 
After preaenting tdaeee demande, Rlbbentrop'e 
manner mellowed eoaewhat, and he epeat the reet of 
hie vlalt attending luncheon# and converging wll&i 
Brltleh atateamen# The Ironio part, however* warn 
that while he wae apeaking In glowing terme of an 
Anglo-Oerman imdeMtending, German troopa were 
a*%%hing Into Austria* Brltlah reaction wae bitter* 
and the Brltlah preae in particular resented Rlbbw»» 
trop*a apparent hypocrisy# 
6 
Ibid#. March 10, 1938, p* 15* 
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a«ws &t th# Amacblue#. Rlbb#ntrop 
left lemdem* eeylmg e# he deperted that he expected 
to return eftwm# A# e reeult* the Angle-Germem 
diacueeleme nbleh were to hmve tmken piece et tbl# 
time vere peetpomed Indefinitely* Thl# wee prebebly 
7 
fortunatê  fer e# the %ew %rk Time# recorded* 
There eppeer# te be e meed throî hout 
Greet Britain that mlĝ t even reault In 
an eacpleelen If the cenveraetlena #ere 
reeumed In the neer future# 
Whatever Rlbbentrop*# Intention# In going te lAmdem 
hi# vlelt eceempll#hed little end did much to harm 
Àngle-Oerman reletlene# It em# generally felt 
threuĝ eut Britain that Rlbbentrop came te tonden 
to dlatract Brltlah attention away frwn event# In 
Auatrla* El# friendly manner ea# Interpreted a# 
an ̂ ungraclou#* and *treacherou#* performance# 
Before Rlbbentrop left Î nden̂  he conferred 
with hie ambaeaador, Herbert von Dlrk#en* Dixit#*: 
ebeerved that during tbeee convereatlen# Rlbbentrop 
#poke of the need to foeter friendly reletlon# with 
Great Britain and to convince her that German claim* 
on Austria were justified» Dlrkeen noted that 
"̂ Ibld# 
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Rlbbeotrop epok# with Ill-will toward# Britain but 
failed to express amy bittemeaa at th# failure of hie 
6 
mimeion# Dlrkaen warn under the impreaeion that Ribbem-
trop wa$ uelmg hlx* aa a eereen to conceal hie true 
attitude and intention# toward th# Britleh government# 
But while It appear# that Rlbbentrop intentionally ml#-
led the Brltiaĥ  the fact# do not #ee« to euiqpert thi# 
a##ertlon* 
While Rlbbentrop wa# in I,ondon, von Meurath wa# 
called back to the foreign office to take charge of th# 
diplomatic detail# of the ànachlu##* Yet Rlbbentrop'# 
name appeared on the Oermmn*»Au#trlan Treaty of Rê Vnlon* 
aigned #iile Rlbbentrop wa# #till in Ix)ndon, Th# queetlon# 
thereforê  ariee#̂  why wa# Rlbbentrop ab#ent from hi# 
poet at #uch a crucial tlm#? ??a# it becaua# Hitler pre» 
ferred the more experienced von Neurath* or wa# Ribben-
trop*# roi# te be in London to euehlon the Britieh 
reactlont Or wa# It po##ible that Rlbbentrop knew 
nothing of the inachluay until after it wa# an acoompllahed 
factT To find an anawer to theee que#tion#̂  It 1# firet 
neceeaary to briefly review the circum#tance# and event# 
l##dln6 to Hitler*# amirch on Vienna# 
On February 15, 1958, Hitler called Chancellor 
8 
Herbert von Dirk#em* Mo#cow, Tokyo. London 




Schttschnigg to Bartohesgadôa» Among other demanda, 
Bltler Ineleted that certain membere of the Austrian 
3(agl Party he included in the Auatrlan cabinet* fblle#-
Ing these dlecueelone# tenelon ever the Auetrlan queetlon 
mounted eteadily* Finally in March 1938,;, Schuschnlgg 
annô moed that a plébiscité would be held to decide 
Awtrla*a fate* But t*o daya befere the aoheduled 
pleblaelte# a German ultimatum waa delivered to the 
Auatrlan govermeant demanding cancellation of the plebla-
clte and realgnatlon of the Austrian chancelier* 
Schuaehnlgg, lacking popular aippert, had no choice but 
to comply with the German demanda* hereupon, Seyaa» 
10 
Zhquart* Kazl leader of the Auatrlan provlaional govern*» 
ment, telegraphed Hitler requeatlimgr German troope to re*-
11 
atore law and order In Auatrla* Hitler complied on 
March 12, 1938, and on the following &&y the I*w of Re* 
union waa algned. Integrating Auatria with Nazi Germany* 
It aeema apparent, therefore, that although the 
Anaehluaa had been Eltler*a objective for a<%ne time, it# 
Ŝehuacimigg, Kurt von, Austrian Federal 
Chancellor, July, 1934*March 11, 1938# 
^̂ 8eyaa*Diquart, Dr# Artur# Auatrlan Natl; 
Minlater of Ihter1er in Schuachnlgg cabinet, February 
15, 1938; Auatrlan federal Chancellor, March 18, 1938; 
executed at Nuremberg October 16, 1946. 
^̂ Documenta on German Porel«n Policy* I, 680* 
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time table had not been definitely eetabllahed; and 
that Hitler, realizing the favorable turn of events, 
acted swiftly and without consultation with hi# 
adviser# In order to present the western powers with a 
fait aoeompll before could Intervene* On this 
bael#, therefore, Rlbbentrop'e presence In London at 
the time of the Aamohlus# appear# aoeldental. 
Although Rlbbentrop probably did not know of 
Hitler*# exact Intention to march on Vienna, he neverthe* 
1$## had earlier advised Hitler that If Germany sought 
a forceful solution to the Austrian problem, the wester* 
power# would not Interfere# Rlbbentrop, two day# 
%2 
before th* Anschlua## wrote from London* 
What will Bngland do If the Austrian problem 
cannot be settled peacefallyT Basically, I am 
oonvlnced that Rngland of her accord will do 
nothing In regard to it at present, but that #h$ 
woQld exert a moderating Influence upon the other 
powers# I believe %$iat the Rpenoh would not go 
to war now over a Oerman solution of the Austrlam 
question, and neither would the allies of Prane# 
nor Italy# %# prere<Luislte, however, would be a 
very quick settlement of the Austrian question# 
If a solution by ibrce should be prolonged for 
any length of time, tdiere would be danger of 
cornqpli cation# # 
Ribbentrop*# memorandum leaves little doubt a# 
to his opinions regarding; the strength of the western 
powers# He was also convinced that the key to avoiding 
western intervention was a swift and forceful solution 
^̂ Ibld#. 265. 
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to th# Austrian problem̂  a move that should aot be post* 
poned* That Rlbbentrop advised Hitler Is well established* 
but to assess the extent to which his advice influenced 
Ritler's decision to annex Austria is more difficult# 
But this muoh is certain* within a few days, Bltler re* 
sponded to the advice set foi*th in the foreign minister's 
mote, observing the suggestion that It be a quick solution* 
Airthermore, considering the confidence that Rlbbentrop 
then enjoyed with the ftiehrer, it se*ms logical to asswse 
that his influence was more than negligible* After all, 
%wior to this. Hitler had depended heavily upon hie 
foreign minister for Infozmation concerning Oreat Britain 
mnd the west and he bad no reason to believe that Rlbben* 
trop was WM;ng on this occasion* 
%roû out the spring of 1638, various attempts 
were made by a%*eat Britain to reach a detent4|» In her 
relations with Oermany* To foster an understanding, the 
British were willing to make concessions, especially 
oonceMaln̂  the colonial problem* Hitler, however, seemed 
unwllllnr to negotiate and repeatedly told Henderson that 
no understanding could be resohed until the campaigns 
sgalnst him In the British press ceased# Although other 
factors undoubtedly played their part, Rlbb#ntrop clearly 
exercised an obstructing Influence upon these efforts to 
bring about an Anglo-German rapprochement* The effect of 
.78*. 
Rlbbentrop̂ a tdvlcm upon Hitler In thlm regard 1$ In* 
13 
barmnt In th# remarks of Otto Dl#trlch, Hltlar'e 
14 
pre** chief, when he wrote* 
Since Rlhbentrop*# return fMm land on, Hitler 
has displayed Intenae dietruet of England - In 
marked eontraat to hie former attitude. It la 
tru# that I r#o*ll oonvereatlone In which Hitler 
commented aaro&atloally uî on Rlbbentropf# 
exaggerated hatred for igngland* But Rlbbentrop*# 
on# elded appraleel# moon bê m to b#v# their 
effect* Ae Si tier becaLme aware of saglmnd'e 
etlffenlng attitude toward hl«, he fell more end 
more under the away of Ribbon trop* $ Anglophobia# 
It la not laplled that Rlbbentrop caat a epell over 
Hitler, for the Pbehrer was not # weak pereomall̂  who 
could be led to and fro by hla advlaera# But at tAi# 
ëaae time, a# Eitl#r*e confidence In Rlbbentrop Inoreaeed 
he depended and more upon the advice of hla foreign 
mlnlater, aspeolally In matter* concerning Rreat Britain# 
Ih the eummer of 1058, a a the Ceeoh crlela became 
more acute* Kltler, Rlbbentrop, and the GeAaan foreign 
office were not without warning eoncemlng the #erlou#n### 
of the aituatlon and what Great Britain*» remotion might 
b# in event of a oo%%fllct# Prom London# von Dlî aen 
cone latently advlaed Rlbbentrop during; the aummar of 1#&8 
that unleea Germany and Great Britain reached agreement 
^̂ Dletrich, Dr# Otto* State Secretary and Head of 
Preaa Dlvlalon in jRelch %lnlatry of propaganda; Reich 
Preaa Chief of Nazi Party* 
^̂ Otto Dietrich, Bltler (Chicago# Henry Regneiy 
Company, 1955), 40*41# 
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oon* war could not be avoided, Dliicaen further 
*utloned that he was convinced that If Qeremny reaorted 
10 military mean# to aolve ̂ e Czech queatlon» England 
15 
fould Ŝflthout a doubt" go to ear on the aide of Prance# 
Rlbbentrop, however, placed little value on 
ilrkaen̂ a advice and paeaed It off aa "'astonishing* end 
Were three te*" He continued to aasur© the Ftiehrer that 
(heee In authority In Oreat Britain #ere half-hearted In 
heir attitude toward central European probing and could 
le 
te relied up<w% to back down at the laet minute, from 
onvereatlona with Hendereon* Rlbbentrop even concluded 
hat @reat Britain would undoubtedly etand aalde In the 
vent of a CeeohvPranoo-Oarman conflict# Rpom Rlbbentrop'a 
IplAwtlo correepondence# it la apparent that he tried 
o elicit a etatemant from Brltlah etateamen to the effect 
hat Oreat Britain would not enter a eonfllet over Oeeoho-
17 
lovakla* It la peaalble that Rlbbentfop wanted to prove 
15 
Documenta On German Foreign Policy# II* 595# 
See alao* Docimente on German PorelRn Policy# I, 
.15S.69# ^̂
w# 8eton*wataon. Prom Mimloh To Daneig (london* 
[ethuen & Co# Ltd, 1959)» til:: 
17 
Gordon A# Craig and Felix Gilbert̂  ed#* fhe 
î lommta (Princeton* Princeton IMlveralty Pre##, 1955), 
See alao# Document# On German Porelxn Policy# II# 
77, & 409.11# 
0̂* 
aonclualvely tbrnt the Brltleh would not rlmk a war over 
»#ntral European problem# and thereby aho* Hitler that 
khe leea bellicoee #aflm were wron̂  In fearing British 
Laterventlom* 
Rlbbentrop# to Inaure that view# contrary to hie 
>w& regarding, Britain*# probable %h»aotloa In event of 
)onfllot did not preval], dleeemlnated In late ewener of 
18 
L95B, the following; circular to all hla foreign mleelonm* 
Ae you know, intensive foreign propaganda hae for 
eome time been epreadlng the fable that Prance would 
Inteznrene In ench a eaae and that Great Britain 
would not etand aaide# TOkle propaganda leave# wa 
cold,;, and I aek you not to let youreelvea be 
InfIwenoed by It 1» any way* I a* convinced* and 
have repeatedly given expreaelon to hla, that 
third power would be ao foolhardy to a.ttack Germany 
in much à oaae, I expeot yon to exprea# thla in 
yowr convereationa, nattrrally a a being your 
conviction aleo* 
Ehle circular and the manner In which Ribbentrop treated 
)lrkmen*a advice well reveal how intolerant he waa of 
contrary opinion# and bow atrongly he dealred that hla 
&he#le of Britain*a weakneae be accepted, 
throughout the summer and fall of 193$, the Cmê  
)reblem continued to be the major concern of European 
xtateamen# In September 1938$ Hitler and Chamberlain 
met for three oonfereneea deaigned to arrive at a lamtlmg 
settlement of German olaima on Caechoalovakia» Rlbbentrop, 
lowever# due to the objection# of Chamberlain, waa denied 
®̂Do cimenta On Oeiman Foreign Poll or. II, 800* 
*81̂  
19 
ma offlelâl roi# In th# dlscusaioa». Bitter, the foreign 
minister attempted to exercise am influence from the toaek-
growBd# Weltaaeher related that Rlbbentrop*# attitude 
during the Munich Oonferencee *a# extremely belllcoa# and 
lAiat he repeatedly advleed Hitler to be harsh with Idno 
Brltleh, adYOoatlng war if neceeaary. Ih faot Rlbbentrop 
90 
aearned to prefer war as a final humiliation on the British» 
Strangely enough, the Munich Oonforence repreeentod 
a low #bb in Blbbentrop's Influenoo with Bltler# At Wunleh* 
the Fuehrer wae not alway# mure of hlneelf and of Ribbon trop'# 
advlee that the Weet would do nothing in regard to C%$cho* 
elovakla# Alaô  Hitler etlll demonatrated a tendency to 
follow the leaderehlp of Muaeollni» He aleo felt that 
war at thia time would not have the necemeary popular 
eupport In Germany# It could aleo be that at Munich Hitler 
w#e tee ting the Weet to eee exactly how far he oould go* 
Be that ae it may, thla much le certain; Munich amply 
aubetantlated Rlbbentrop̂ e conviction# and convinced Hitler 
that the westers, leader# were "little worm#" who would '• 
never go to war over Cmechoalovakia# For ae the Mew %epk 
81 
Time# recorded In October 1938# 
20 
Em#t von Welzaacker, Memoir#* trans, John 
Andrew# (Oiicago: Henry Regnery Company* 1951), 150*55# 
21 
Mew York Time# » October 14, 1958, p# 1$ 
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view held In London la that H#rr von 
Rlhb#ntrop, who is the la&der of the antl-Brltl#h 
forces In Berlin, now enjoy# the 100% confldenoe 
of the Ch&noellor because the Foreign Minister 
wm# right in predicting that Britain and Prance 
would not go to war under any c Iroumatancea at 
the preeent time* 
Hitler moon became diapatlefled with Munich* 
regretted that he had not demanded more# Be reeumed hi# 
attack# on Britain and the Brltleh prees» But with 
Hitler*# change in attitude came a atlffening of Britiah 
policy# The Britiah felt that Hitler wa# to blame for 
the rapid deterioration in Anglô Qenaan relation# becauee 
he had not taken full advantage of the favorable atmoa-
phew created at Munich* Goneequently, Europe once mo%»e 
faced the threat of wir# 
Rlbbentrop alao wa# dlaappolnted in Munich# He 
felt that Hitler had not fully exploited the Weatem 
power#* A# a reeult, Rlbbentrop put two theme# into olz%u-
latlon* flrat̂  that Germany had not fully exploited the 
weat*# fear of war; and aecondly* that Bngland bad uaed 
the Munich Conference to gain tim# In order to atrlke at 
a later datê  when #he waa better armed# Although there 
1# no apecific evidence to bear It out* it would probably 
not be far fr«m fact to conclude that Rlbbentrop, with 
theae two contention#, wa#, to a large degree, responsible 
for Hitler*# changed attitude* 
2È 
Weizsftcker, og$ olt », 156« 
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âft®r Munich, and throughout the wlmter of 1938-
39, Hitler and his foreign minister continued their 
efforts to keep the western powers apart* In December 
193G* Rlbbentrop went to Paris to sign the GerMm-Frenoh 
Declazmtlon̂  a document deolaring that no outstanding 
territorial differences existed between the two countries » 
Rlbbentrop ooncludad from this that France Imd rwounoed 
her Interest in eastern Europe and would limit her affair* 
23 
to her Empire# Rlbbentrop also Interpreted the Germa&-
Frendh Declaration as a major division in the relation# 
between Paris and London* With these oonoluslons, and 
mindful of the weaknee# the West had displayed at Blunidi, 
Rlbbentrop advised Hitler that he oould now solve the 
Gmeoh question without fear of Intoiventlon* 
Rlbbentrop* s advice eventually found its mai** for 
in #aroh 1939 the ozeoh crisis oame to a head, the Oenmaa 
press increased the vielenoe of Its propaganda denouncing 
alleged atrocities occurlng behind the Gaedk border* 
Slovakia and Ruthenla declared their Independenoe of Prague 
and appealed to Gennany for protection# finally, on Mkreh 
23 
AH*, ̂71* 
For text of German-French Declaration sees 
Î cuments On German Fsreiga Policy, I?, 470. 
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84 
IS, 1999, Premldent Haeha flew to Berlin In en attempt 
:o stay Hitler'e hand# His effort* were ia vaia, however* 
lecauee while the Cxeeh president wae conferring with 
lltler and Rlbhentrop, German troop* marched into Prâ e# 
%e capitulation of Prague once again proved to 
Kltler that hi* foreign mlnlater wa# right, for apart from 
rerbal pro tee te the western powers stood still* Although 
Aere are no document* to prove that Rlhbentrop** advlc# 
Ml* the leajor factor In Hitler** deolelon to march on 
»rague. It 1* not difficult to make thl* conclu*Ion# TEhe 
mechluaj* had Increaeed Hitler'* confidence in Rlbbentrop** 
idvlce and Munich had conflnaed It» Rlbhentrop preached 
I doctrine of Britain** moral and material decadence* a 
loo trine to lAtieh Au*tria, Munich, and Prague *eemed to 
}ear ample teetlmony# The occupation of Pi»gue and the 
*lnal liquidation of the C$ech *tate therefore eonvinoed 
II tier that he had a free hand in Rurope and aerved to #et 
Ale etage for tl%e final act the dee true tion of Poland# 
24 
Hacha, Emil, Preeldent of Czechoaloveklan Supreme 
;ourt, 1985; member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
it %e Hague; Prealdent of the Ceeohoalovak Republic, 
fovemker 30, 1938 to %Krch 15, 1939» 
(BAPTER V 
FRO* PRAGUE TO DANZIG 
Prmgue, remultlng in the flnel dlemembermeat @f the 
Czech 3 ta te* again proved to Hitler the correotneaa of hie 
foreign mlnlater*# advice concerning the reaction# of the 
western pcwere* Rlbbentrop »ae eoneequently elevated In 
51 tier*# eoteem# Bow having seen demon#trated tble new 
evldenoe of British and Frenoh weakness* Hitler eonfl» 
dently tiimed to a settlement on the Danslg problem. And 
as In the Csech orlals, Mbbentrop from the beginning 
assured Bltler that he woiild have nothing to fear from the 
west In forcing a solution of the Polish question* 
But Prague had at last brought about a change In 
lùie attitude of the British government# Mille wamlng 
that be would never again believe In Hitler's assuranceŝ  
Neville Chamberlain announced Britain*s peace efforts 
would be based on armaments and protective defense# To 
Rlbbentrop, still posing as Hitler*s expert on Great 
Britain, these warning went unheeded# And therein lies 
the tragedy of the opening of World War II# 
Before turning to the Danalg question. Hitler and 
his foreign minister decided first to settle the problem 
"86— 
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of Kernel# On Kerch 81, 1959, seven days after th# 
ocouprntlom of fregue end under heavy Oermam preeeure* 
Hthuamle eur rende red Memel to Maml Germany# Wee tern 
reaction wa# ellght, the reeult %!ot eo much of the ewlden* 
neee of Hitler'a action ae of the fact that Xmael r#̂  
preeented one of the moet legal of Hitler** clalma* Pbr 
a long tlm#. It had generally been accepted throughout 
Burope that Lithuania had little juetlflcatlon In retaining 
%il$ email territory bordering gaat frueela* With the 
Memelland placed on the rack wlldi the %ilneland, Auetrla, 
and Ozeehoelovakla# Hitler and Rlbbentrop beg#n to oonco6t 
a oaae for the annexation of Danmlg* 
ghe @e%%an-Polleh problem, eo far ae It concerned 
%k«l <3ermany* datée from 1954, ehen Hitler, In an effort 
to relieve exletlng ten#lone, concluded a ten year non-
aggreeelon pact with Poland* From 1954 to 1938, relatione 
between the two countrlee followed a relatively mnooth 
couree# But the Anechluee# the Munich Oonference (to 
which the Pole* were not Invited), and lAie capitulation 
of Prague revived old anxletie# and ceneed the two 
countrlee to drift rapidly apart# 
Shortly after taie Munich Conference and In a conver-
eatlon with Mpeki, the Polleh ambaeeador, Rlbbentrop eet 
L̂lpeki, Joeef, Polleh Ambaaeador to Germany, 
November 16, 1934 to September 1, 1959# 
,̂ 7. 
torth the Germ&m claim to Dasaig &md proposed that# (1) 
Danzig be Incorporated within the Third Reich; (2) extsm-
territorial roada and railroads be built across the 
3anzlg territory and acroaa the Corridor by Germany and 
Poland# (S) Poland have a free port in I3»n«lg; (4) th# 
frontier# be mutually guaranteed; and (5) the Ron*Ag-
2 
r̂eaaion Paot be extended to twentyfive yeara# Lipski 
replied no agreement wa# poaaible ao long aa Germany 
3 
demanded the incorporation of Danzig* 
Ih January 1939, Ribbentrop went to ivaraaw for a 
bhree day via it under the pretext of repaying a recent 
4 
3eok viait to Berlin* Since hia attitude waa unuaually 
Criendly (he apoke in glowing term# of Germany*# fondneaa 
For her foliah neighbor) Ribbentrop'# main objective aeem# 
ko have been to draw foland into the Anti-Oomintem Pact* 
ro thia euggeation* and in reply to ̂ e propoaala pre* 
yioualy aubmitted to I,ipaki# Beck gave hie gmeat a atrong» 
ly worded almoat wholly negative reply# And thup with the 
Failure of yet another miaaion, Ribbentrop left Waraaw 
a 
L, B. Marnier, Diplomatic Prelude# 19g8-»1939 
[Lond o n #  K a c N i l l a n  &  Co#,^' E t d * ' » ' " 1 § % ' ) '  
Îbid*. 40. 
*Beck, Josef, Poliah Foreign Minister from 1932 
to 1939* 
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"gremtly diaoontentod," displaying "ooldnaaa #md 111-
5 
bumour#" 
In Mmrob 1039, Rlbbantrop again coaveraed with tb* 
Pollah «uËb#aa#idor, but oa tbla oeo*alon hla maimer *&a 
ab&rper amd more demandlrng# He Imalated that bla earlier 
proposals were atill viewed by the German government as & 
Bine nom In amy dlaenaalona seeking a aolwtlon to the 
Daneig queatlon* At the oonvera&tlona* end, Rlbbentrop 
[landed tlpakl & note embodying; bla earlier propoaala and 
6 
requ*ated an Immediate reply* 
Beek replied to tbe German note on March 25$ 1939 
by getting forth a coxmter-propoaal providing for m jolmt 
Qerman Pollah guarantee of Danalg to aeo%%̂  both the 
polltleel and economic rlghta of Dentlg aa well aa the 
rl̂ jhta of the German and Pollah population# within the 
Danzig territory* Beok'a note mad# It elear that w#re 
Demany to peralat in demanding the incorporation of 
D#n%lg into the Third !?eich, Poland aaw no eaay aolution 
of the problem* 
Beok*a refuaal to bow to Plbbentrop̂ a demanda dead-
looked Gei%an-Pollah negotiation#* and the aitwation rapid­
ly a#atim#d crisla proportion#* To Rlbbentrop*a aatonlah-
a#nt and aager, th# next development came from London* 
M̂arnier, og* 68* 
g 
%zl Conspiracy & Aggreeelon. VIII# 492*04* 
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Pollowlmg a brief visit by Beek to Gr*#t Britsia, #%# 
Britigh goverxmont mnnoimcod on April 6, 1959 the 
conclu#ion of am Aaglo*»Polish Pact* Referred to #a the 
'̂ blemk ohedk* of #)rld War II* thi# agreement provided 
that Poland and Britain were to give each other mutual 
a##i#tanee ehould either or both partie# be attacked by a 
7 
third power» Thi# unre#trained guarantee to Poland re* 
preeented an almoat umbellevable change of policy om the 
imrt of the Chamberlain government, for it wa# the fir#t 
time Britain had ever unreeervedly given a military 
oommltment to an ea#tern European power whoee geographic 
poaltion obviou#ly rendered direct Briti#h help impo##lble« 
Thi# development in what now becamie a three-cornered 
Poll#h problem gurprlaed both Hitler and Ribbentrop* 
After the war, Ooerlng recalled that the conclu#ion of the 
Angl0"f0li#h Aict ̂ âade a deep impre##ion on Hitler* 
but not to the point of convincing him that Britain would 
8 
go to war# Similarly taken aback by the Pact, Rlbbentrop 
likewi#e refuaed to believe that Britain would intervene 
in th# event of a forceful aianexation of Danalg# Von 
Papen, for inatance, apoke with Rlbbentrop on April 7, 
1939 and concluded that the foreign mini#ter wa# #till 
\a*l Conapiracy & AKKre##ion. VIII, 498-94. 
6 
Masl Conspiracy ̂  AgAreeaion. I, 719. 
9 
eonvlnced "that Greet Britain was only bluffing." Mor 
lid Rlbbentrop** attitude change during the next month, 
mince he told the Eungarlan prime mlnlater "̂ that It wa# 
ale firm conviction that̂ , no amtter what happened In 
10 
Europe* no apench or Bn̂ lleh soldier would attack aermany*'' 
Hitler anewered the Anglô Pollah Pact In hie 
Relchatag speech of April 28, 1̂ 39, After dwelling 
orlefly on the juetlficatlon for him action in Cmeche#" 
mlovakla. Eltier turned to the Pollah queetlom* He etated 
;flth regret that a lace Ck'eat Britain eaw fit to oppeee 
aermamy over Poland he therefore had no alternative hut 
to denounce the Angle»Qer»*n Naval Agreement of 19*5# In 
concluding, Hitler reatated the German claim to Danelg, 
ance more Inalatln+t that a aettlewint could be reached 
11 
only on the baala of the German propoaale* 
On the eame day am Bltler*a apeech, Rlbben̂ pop 
notified the Polish govemm̂ t that hie demanda muat be 
the baela of any agreement* The Polea anewered In May 
flth the aesertlon that they aaw no contradiction between 
g 
Fraag von Papen̂  Memoir# (New Torlcf E.P» Dutton 
k Conqpany, Dtc#, 1953), 
See alao: Marnier, *11*, 155, 
^̂ %ami Oonaplracy Aggreeelon. VII, 192, 
13 
R. We Seton4.Wat@on, grow Munich To DanzlA ( London# 
Kethuen & Co#, Ltd#, 1999), . 
"*93." 
th# Anglo-follah Pact and the Oerm&n̂ Pollah Agreement of 
1934# %» Polish note further argued th»t the Polish 
goverruwnt viewed the Germmn dem&nde ee an ultimatum̂  
it would never willingly gee ï̂ aneig become part of the 
12 
German Reich* 
In Hitler*# epeeoh and T?ibbentrop*9 dlplomatio oorre* 
mpondenoe» it aeem# apparent Qiat* deaplte Poland*# refueal 
to eubmit to Qerman preaeure and Britain*# hardening polloy 
K# Indicated In the AnglomPoliah Pact, both Hitler and 
Ribbentrop ateadfaetly refuaed to believe that their 
motion# would preolpltate a general war in Europe# 
Hitler*8 confidence in (Germany*# poeltlon vi#*a»vi# 
Chreat Britain wae Increaaed a# a reault of the Akct of 
Steel concluded between Glano and Ribbentrop on May 00* 
1939* The German»Italian Alliance* which tranaformed 
the loose Ro«**Berlin Azi# into a formal military alliance* 
increa#ed Hitler*# and Rlbbentrop*# expectation# of re*» 
eolving the Poli#h l##ue without Incurring the intervention 
13 
of Britain and l&ie weatem power#* With thi# in mind* 
Hitler began to formulate hi# plana for the liquidation 
14 
0f Poland* He told hi# general# on M#y 25* 1939* that# 
12 *a%l Con#niracy & A&Kre##lon. VIII* 445-48* 
^̂ Malcol* Muggeridge* ed* Clano*# Diplomatic Paner# 
14 
lazi ConapiraoT & Agare##lon. I* 392-400# 
9̂2. 
We must attack Poland at the flret suitable 
opportiaaity* We cannot expect a repetition of 
the Czech affair* There will be a war. Our ta#k 
ia to isolate Poland# There miat he no aimultaneou# 
conflict with the Western power## fundamentally, 
therefore, conflict with Poland « beginning with 
the attack on Poland * will only be avicoeaaful 
if the Weatem powers keep out of it# If this is 
impoaaible it will be better to attack in the 
Meat and settle Poland at the same time. 
litler went on to state the reasons why he thought Great 
Sritain would not intervene# 
England*# atake in the war la unimaginably 
great# Our enemiea have men who are below average* 
No peraonal tiea, no master#, no men of action. 
The Engliah did not emerge from the laat war 
atrengthened$ R*om a maritime point of vieŵ  
nothing waa achieved* Conflict between England 
and Ireland, the South African Ilnion became more 
independent, oonceaaiona bad to be made to India, 
England ia in great danger, her indue trie# are 
unhealthy* A Britiah etatéaman can only look 
in the future with concern* Therefore the proba­
bility i# a till great that the Weat will not 
interfere# It may, however, turn ont differently 
with gngland and P%»nce, one cannot predict with 
certainty# I figure on a trade barrier̂  not on 
blockade, and with it the aeveranoe of relation## 
Riat Ribbentrop ahared thia aame view ia revealed 
* conduit de langage be aent to all foreign mlaaion# 
In May 1939 in which he atated that the Poliah problem 
lould be aettled at anytime by Hitler in fortŷ eî t hour# 
u&d that the western power# would be unable to render 
iffactive aaai#tance to Poland# It is alleged that Ribben* 
trop stated at thii time that if he heard of anyone 
«pressing «a opposite view, ha would personally a hoot him 
ind assume full responsibility to Hitler for hi# 
15 16 
action# General OnderIan* writing in the post»w«r 
period and commenting upon events in June 1939# con* 
17 
eluded* 
êre wee no lack of political warning#. But 
Hitler and his foreign minister had pereuaded 
themselves that the Western powers would never 
risk a war with Germany and that they, therefore, 
had a free hand in Eastern Europe* 
Throughout the summer of 1959 ̂ Hitler was uncompro-» 
mislng in his demands on Poland, The British, however, 
demonstrated a willingness to reach an understanding# In 
18 
July, Sir Horace Wilson, presumably at the instruction 
of Chamberlain, approached von Dirksen with a broad out­
line for a solution to outstanding political, economic, 
and military mattew# At the heart of Wllson*s proposal# 
3kmier, op* cit,. 625# 
See also* Craig & Gilbert, The Diplomats. 436# 
Guderian, Col# Genewl Helna, %)rld War II 
Commander of Panzer Troops; Chief of Staff, 1944*45; 
helped defeat July 1944 putsch against Hitler; succeeded 
by Rrebs# 
17 
Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader# trans# Constantin# 
Fitegibbon, (Mew Torkt 1 #*'"!'# ' button AT Co *, 1962), 65# 
18 
Wilson, Sir Horace, Chief Industrial Adviser 
to British Government, 1930*1959, seconded to the 
Treasury for service with the Prime Minister, 1935-
19 W# 
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was the «xargestioïî that Great Britain aisd (Germany oonolud# 
ft non-aggiesaiOB pact which would, thereby# free Great 
19 
Britain from her Polish commitmenta# ûi early Augnat, 
Wilson again put forward the same suggestions, emphasising 
the need for Great Britain to undo the Polleh knot a# a 
k%ml# for an underatandlng with Germany* 
In both inetanee®, Dlrkeen cabled Wilson's proposals 
to Berlin but received not the ellghteet reeponee from 
20 
hie foreign mlnlater# Thereupon̂  amd convinced of the 
Importance of Wlleon*» proposal» aa the key to avoiding 
What otherwlee appeared an Inevitable conflict* DlAeen 
travelled to Berlin In mld#Aug:uet pereonally to preeent 
these vlewe to Rlbbentrop and Hitler# 
Dlrkaen arrived In Berlin on Auguat 13, 19̂ , the 
day following the diacueeloxw between Rlbbentrop, Hitler 
and Clano at Salzburg* Dlikaen flrat, and without eucoeaa, 
requeated an Interview with Rlbbentrop* He next conferred 
with weltaacker concerning the fate of hla reporte from 
London* Welteacker gave a vague reply inferring that 
Etlbbentrop had filed them in the waatebaaket# Dlrkaen did 
learn, however, that hie analysis of Great Britain and 
the reports of hie discussions with Wilson had been in-
19 
Gordon A* Craig and Pellx Gilbert, Bd*, TW 
Diplomate (Princeton# Princeton lAilverelty Pre##, 1955). 
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Herbert von Dlrkeen, Mo acow, Tokyo. London (Norman: 
Dhlvereity of Oklahoma Frees, Ï§BFJ7 2S¥-g'S. 
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:erpP0t@d by Rlbben trop further aigma of Brltlah 
21 
feakneag»** After waiting for severRl day# without 
receiving an interview with Ribbentrop, Dlrksam, in dls-
gnat;, realgned from the foreign office and wrote Rlbben» 
:rop a lengthy memorandum atatlng that Great Britain would 
8# 
goat certainly go to war If Oeiwany attacked Poland, 
Riia dlacuaeion of Rlbbenkrop*» relatione with von 
)lTkaen al̂ nificantly reveal Ribbentrop** prediepoaed 
lonvlotion that regardleaa of what happened Great Britain 
fould not fight# Ribbentrop either believed thla ao 
itron̂ ly or elae had doubt* of the strength of hi# own con-
rlotlona #o that he refused to liaten to m&yone with a 
contrary opinion̂  regardleaa of how good the eouroe* !Riere 
la, however» one additional factor which might have in»;' 
riuenced Ribbentrop to diaregard Dirkeen*a advice* At thla 
point* German'»5oviet negotiation* were prooeedlmg at a 
papld pace and it aewied poealble that an alliance could 
)e reached with the Soviet TMlon* It ia poaaible* there* 
rore$ that Ribbentrop concluded that if thia alliance 
:culd be realiged it would force Great Britain into an even 
yeaker poaltion and that Germany could therefore well afford 




Th# eonvers&tioïiB between. Hitler, Rlbbentrop, and 
Clano, held in mlâ-âuguat, 1939, at Salfburg, provide 
additional proof that Hitler and Rlbbentrop flimly be* 
lieved that a Oermam̂ Poliah conflict would mot draw Great 
25 
Britain Into a war* Clano recorded that# 
Hitler repeatedly etated that be is oonvinoed 
that the conflict will be localized end gives the 
following reasons $ Aranoe and England will cer­
tainly make extremely theatrical gesture# but will 
net go to war̂  beeauae their military and moral 
ppeparation* are not euch aa to allow the* to be* 
gin conflict, At the moat the Engllmh cam 
get up a blockade in the Horth 8ea between the 
eoaata of Scotland and Scandanavia and at mouth 
of the Channel# They might even attempt gome air 
action agalnmt Gorman centre#, but that la not 
probablê  ei%ier for fear of f̂ eAaan antl*alrcraft 
defoncea or fwir of reprlaala# 
Rlbbentrop expreeaed hie conviction in thla regard bg; re# 
marking to Clano that "hia information and above all hla 
PByctM)loA:lca3̂  knowledge of Bngland made him certain that 
24 
any armed Brltlah intervention 1@ ruled out#** Clano 
disagreed wl̂  Bltler and Rlbbentrop but alncerely hoped 
that they were correct# Cleno recalled that on one 
occaaion during the#e dlgcuBalon#̂  he and Rlbbentrop were 
walking In th@ garden and he aaked the German foreign 
minleter* *W©11, Rlbbentrop̂  what do you wantT 3he Corri­
dor or ranzigt »Fot any mora,* Rlbbentrop replied* *We 
w&at War*" 
M̂uggerldge, eg»* MS*# 
24 
Ibld.̂  897, 
^̂ Galeaaao Clano, The Clano Diariea {New York* Etouble-
day & Company, lac,, 1946), 686, 
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Ciano's recolleétions seem to leave little doubt 
tiat Hitler and Rlbbentrop were bent on the invasion of 
Bland and that both were convinced that Great 
rlt&in would remain paaalve. To wh&t extent Hitler*# 
ttltnde was Influenced by Rlbbentrop la difficult to judge, 
at that his Influence was more tiian aliwht is Implied In 
on HasseH*s Diary when be wrote J "Ooeriag no longer baa 
aeh to say; Hiraaler, Goebbela, and Rlbbentrop are now 
26 
anaglng Hitler»** At another point* Von Bmeeell r*o@rd#d 
o&t# **AcGordlng to #11 reporta, Rlbbentrop la the man 
bo has the most Influence with Hitler#" It Is umder-
tandable tb#t Sltley ##s dependent to a oonsldermble degr## 
pon Rlbbentropfs advice and judgement, because #ft#f 
Ibbentrop had be m entirely oorreot in his predlotloms 
r the reactions if the wemtom powers# And the Aaehrer 
id no reason to believe that Rlbbentrop*s "paycholoRloal 
aowledge" of Britain was anything but oorreot# 
On August 23̂  1030, Rlbbentrop returned from Nosoo# 
Baring the Germam-̂ Sovlet (Areaty of Fon-Aggresslon# Rils 
almlnated a work of several months, beginning roughly 
26 
Ulrich von Hassell, the Yon Hassell (Doubleday 




rte F Brltmlm*# gusaraat#» to Poland, and was aimed at 
iTldlng Russia and the West®m power## It had h##n 
Ibbentrop*# contention throughout that if a Ruaaian 
llianc# could be obtained, Great Britain would be left 
ithout a potential ally in eaatem gurop# and would there-
or# be even more reluctant to involve herself in a general 
ar over Poland# fh« Germam-Seviet Alliance increaaed 
itler*# eateem for Ribbentrop and hia diplomacy and com"" 
inced the fuehrer that Great Britain bad b##n forced into 
poaition from which ehe could do nothinti but alt back 
nd peaaiv#ly witm### #venta, 
Th# importanc* Hitler attached to the Ruaaian 
lllance in ruling out poaeible Brltiah intervention la 
learly revealed in a conference with hia generala em 
28 
ugumt #9, 1930* Be atated* 
Colonel aeneral von Brauchitach baa promiaed 
m# to bring th# war againat Poland to a conclueion 
witbln a f#w w»#k## If h# would hav# told me that 
it weùld tak# two y#ara or even one year only, I 
would not have iaaued the order to march and would 
have temporarily entered into an alliance with 
England inataad of Russia# p»r w# cannot conduct 
a long war# In any eaa# a new altuatlon haa new 
been created* I have witneaaed the miaerable worm# 
Daladier and Chamberlain in Munich# They will be 
too cowardly to attack, fhey will go no further 
than blockade. Against it w# hav# our autarchy 
and th# Rue a Ian mw material»# Poland will b# d#-
populatad and colonlaad with 0#rman#* My pact with 
Poland was only meant to atall for time# And be-
sides, gentlemen, in Russia will happen Just what 
I hav# practiced in Poland# After Stalin'# death 
28 
Iftgi Conapiracy & Aggreeaion, VII, 755*54# 
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(b# la seriously 111) w® aha11 cruah the Soviet 
tJsaloa* 
Rpom this point, events moved swiftly# On August 
SS, 1939, Britain anawered the Oermaa-soviet Alllame# by 
amnoumclag %at the Anglô foliah pact had been aigmed 
and thereby made effiolal# It is plain that neither 
Hitler nor Ribbontrop had counted on this development# 
Rlbbentrop testified at Nuremberg that following the 
British announcement he went to Hitler and perauaded the 
29 
Fuehrer temporarily to halt the Invaalon of Poland* 
Cfoerlng testified that Hitler waa alao dlaturbed# Qoerlng 
atated that on the aame day that Britain gave her guarantee 
to Poland Hitler called him on the telephone to tell him 
that be had a topped the Invaalon acheduled for the following 
day, Goerlng aaked for how lemg, and Hitler replied that 
it waa jnat temporary but he would flrat have to aee If he 
30 
oould eliminate Brltlah intervention* 
Although Britain*a unreserved announcawent to 
support Poland dlaturbed Hitler and hie foreign minlater, 
it nevertheleaa did not deatroy their convictiona that 
Great Britain would not go to war. General Guderlan, 
oonmenting upon these events of August 25*26, substantiated 
@1 
this when he wrote I 
9̂à#l Conaplraoy & Â reaaion. VIII, §3S-36« 
(̂*Ibid.. 634. 
31 
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3y &t a aeeret mgreememt with the 
Ruasiaas during these day* H ltl#r had Imaiimd 
th# prAtaction of bla rear Im the ©vest of war 
bvt owlmg to Rlbbemtrop*# dlaaatroix# ImflMemee# 
lllixalom# were atlll belmg cherlehed oomoermlmg 
the pretahle reaotloma of the *eeter* pewera# 
It was eoaaldered imlikely that they wowld 
declare war* 
*eaawhile relatloma betweem Areat Brltal* amd 
ermamy contla%ed through Headeraoa im Berlin» Oa Awg«st 
1@@9 mi tier* Hemdereom a#d Ribbewtrop met la ooafer* 
aoe# B|eader#«a read a letter from Chamberlala la which 
he lattLr aekaowledged the meed for a eettlememt aad for 
he frlex̂ hlp ef oermamy aad a%igga#ted that direct 
%otlatleaa begim Immediately oa the prlmelplea ef mafe-
uardimg Poland*# eeaeatlal latereet# amd reeolvlag the 
elleh preble# by aa imteraatleaal gwaraatee# Chamber* 
al»*# letter apparemtly left the doer epea for agreemeat 
ad paaaed the laltlatlve to Hitler# At thla polat, it 
eewed dlffleult f*r Hitler te decide em agreemeat or war# 
ei##aoker recorded , that 51 tier mad Rlbbeatrep apeat the 
emalader of the day trylag to decide on lAilch couree to 
ake* CM mlautê  accerdlâ  ̂te welmaaoker* they apoke la 
he frleadlleat terme about Great Brltala aw5 the mext 
la%te they talked of waglag mtr at amy price, b%t as the 
ay were oa their thought# turned mere aad more toward# 





Plimlly on August 29 Fltler answered Chamberlain*# 
letter by telling Rendereon that he etlll deelred an Anglo* 
German underatandlng but that the Pollah problem oonatl-
tuted a barrier to agreement# Hitler al#o etated that h# 
i&w mo possibilité of resolving the que#tion by negotiation 
but was, however, still willing to enter into direct 
lieotiaaion## At the #ame time, Ribbent%*op told Henderaon 
that he would immediately draft a set of propoaal# aimed 
kt a aolution* He further aaeured the Britiah ambasmador 
that if a Poliah repreaentative appeared within twenty» 
54 
four hour#, he would be well received* Although the 
Chamberlain letter aeemed to have moderated Hitler*# ten* 
womewhat, it by jao mean# convinced Hitler and Ribbantrop 
bhat Great Britain would honor her Pollah commitment## 
3eneral Haider, in hi# Diary. #tat#d that *a# a reeult 
)f the GhamAerlain letter, the impreaaion in Berlin wa# 
that Great Britain waa a till aoft on the laaue of a major 
far#* 
55 
Emat von Relmaacker, Memoir# ( Chicago : Henry 
Regnery Company, 1951) 208, 
'̂H&gi Con»piracy & AKgre##ion. VIII, 466*69, 
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Haider, Fran#, German General, Chief of Army 
General Staff, Dacember 1958 to October 194B* 
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la the late evening of August 30, 1939, Rlbbentrop 
57 
kooompenled by the Interpreter Schmidt, met with Header-
»on to irecelve the Brltleh government*e reply to Hitler*# 
%ote of the preceding day, Rlbbentrop*# mood wa# hoetll## 
Î® ranted at Bender#on because th# Polish repreeentatlv# 
lad not yet appeared* Eendereon replied that to #xpeot 
flthln twenty*four hour# a Polish representative Wbo bad 
lot even #een the German propoeal# wa# unreaaonable* 
Fbllowlng a heated debate» Rlbbentrop f̂ rloualy produced 
k document and read the German government*# propomal# In 
3erman #o rapidly that Eendereon wa# unable to gra#p their 
Pull content* When Rlbbentrop flnlahed* Hendereon a#ked 
Por a copy of the propoeal# for tranamlttal to the Brltlah 
&md Poll#h government#* Bit much to Hendereon*#, and ev%# 
;ch##idt*# #urprl#e Rlbbentrop re fumed, aaylng. It wa# new 
boo late anyway #lnoe the Polleh repreeentatlve had failed 
bo appear* With thl#, the converaatlon# ended In th# meet 
38 
mpleaeant atmo#pbere* 
Sebmldt, Dr* Paul Otto, Interpreter In the 
}ermm Foreign Mlnletry, 1925-1645* 
38 
mk*l Oon#x>lraoT & ̂«:gre##lon. VIII, 472-75. 
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Both H#iad#r#om mmà aehmidt l*t#r that th#y 
firmly believed that Ribbeatrop bad refueed to give Bemder-
#em th# pMp###!# b#*#%## to# f##y#d that ar##t Brltal# 
#o%ld b# abl# t# p#r#uad# Pelamd to agree t# the 0#rm#m 
50 
damaad# amd w#uld tkoa mullify emy exow## t# attack Polaad* 
R&l# jW&ememt «««sa valid almo# It *a# f#lt at th# tlm# 
that th# Germaa d#mamd# were mot, Im thamaelve#,; emtlrely 
imreamemabl# amd might well haw# ##rv#d a# a b*#l# f#r 
a#gotlatlom#* But lmat#ad, Rlbb#mtPop oh#8# to eat all 
thr#ad# leadlmg to a p#a##fal aolwtlom, thereby falllmg t# 
d# hi# part im prevemtlmg a altuatlom which ##uld emly 
lead t# war, 
ûm Aixgoet 51, 1959, Hltl#y d#flmit#ly decided %p## 
ear amd gave erder fer the attaA #m felamd i# eoimemc# 
th# fellewlmg mormlmg* Qm September 5, 195#^ after twe 
day# of the p#ll#h*@ermam flg^tlmg, Areat Brltalm declared 
ear om 0###mmy# Dr# Sahmldt, who tramalated th# Britleh 
aete to Hitler, clearly recorded Bltler*# amd Rlbbemtrep*# 
40 
r##ctl#m# wh#m h# wrote* 
Wh#m I #mt#r#d th# room, Hltl#r wa# elttlmg at 
him d##k amd R11»b#mtfep #t#od by th# wlmd#w# B#th 
looked mp expeetamtly ae I earn# Im* I #topped at 
eem# dletamc# frmrn Eltl#r*a d##k, amd «lowly 




trmn#lmt#d the British government*# ultimatum# 
When I finished there w&s complete silence# 
Hitler sat immobile, gazing before him# He was 
not at a lose* am afterward# etated» nor did he 
rage a# other# allege# He eat completely ellent 
and umeovlng* 
After an interval which #e«med an age, h# 
turned te Rlbbentrop who had remained # tending by 
the window# **Wtmt mowT** a#ked Hitler with a aavage 
look, a# though implying that hi# Pbreign Mini#ter 
had mlaled him about Bngland*# probable reaotlon* 
Rlbbentrop answered quietly) "I aaaime the 
French will hand in a similar note within the hour# 
Althoug# Rchmldt wa# the only other pereon preeent 
rhen Hitler and Rlbbentrop received the Brltleh ultimatum̂  
t̂hera ahared the aame view# Otto Dietrich, Hitler*# pre## 
41 
ihief, writing In the pe#t*war period* remarked# 
Hitler had not expected a&gland and Mmnoe to 
enter the war on behalf of Poland# It wa# plain te 
#ee bow #tunned he wa# by the declaration of war# 
He thoû t the We#tern piowér# were not eufficiently 
re*armed and believed the Weat Wall oonatltnted a 
political ahield againat them# Tbl# miacalcnlation 
on Hitler*# part wn# ultimately rooted in hi# 
complete lack of under#tending of moral factor# 
in international politic# and hi# excluaive faith 
in force# Bnt Rlbbentrop al#o undoubtedly played 
a fateful part# It 1# true that Hitler could not 
be ewayed once he bad made a deolalon, but without 
Rlbbentrop he would not have come to auch perverae 
conoluaion# about Eagland# Although unteaohable, 
he depended upon hi# foreign mlniater for the fnct# 
of life abent foreign countriea and diplwmatic re» 
latlona# If Rlbbentrop had advleed agalnat it* he 
would acarcely have undertaken the attack on Poland, 
with the conaequencea that inevitably flowed out of 
it* given the pelltloal altuatlon of the time# 
41 
Otto Dietrich, Hitler# C Chicagoi Henry Begaery 
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42 
idmlral Raeâar, in his poet-war testiaonies, placed th# 
mjor portion of the blame for the outbreak of the war 
43 
iquarely on Rlbbentrop when he saidi 
Dk my opinion» it warn net given to the Fuehrer 
to grasp fully the mentality of the Bmgliahe The 
peraon ef Rlbbentrop waa in thla connection # 
special obstacle insofar as he made difficult th# 
tran#ml#alon te the fuehrer of conception#, based 
on decade# of experience, and on historical etudie# 
of experienced diplomat# like von Meurath and the 
diplomat# of the Kavy, which conception# could have 
#e%̂ ed the P\%ehrer a# the ba#l# of hi# judgemw&t# 
and deci#lon#, 
the part of the Engllmh, the die-hard Germano­
phobe# began to poi#om the atâ aphere# Oa the part 
of the Oenwn#, th# appointment of the equally 
atupld and conceited and diplomatically unuaabl# 
von Rlbb#mtrop a# ambeasador in London, and lat#r 
a# succeaeor to Reurath a# foreign minister, made 
it lmpo##lble fer every tedlouely prepared agr##-
ment to develop## 
fevlle Renderaon, writing at the end of hi# ml##lon# 
;#nerally agreed with Dietrich, Schmidt, and Pmeder and 
compared Bi#marok and the telegram incident t# Rlbben-
;rop and hi# refuaal to aubmit the German propeaal# tke 
light of Auguat 50, and concluded that Rlbbentrop felt 
le needed a war to prove he wa# a "#econd Biamarck#** 
44 
lendewon furrier ob#ei*ved that# 
It is impoealble to exaggerate the malign ia-
fluence of Rlbbentrop, Goebbela, Eimmler, and com-
pany. It wa# conalatently sinister, not #o much 
because of its auggeetlveneea {since Hitler alone de» 
^̂ Raeder, Erich, Grand Admiral, Commander in Chief 
f̂ German Navy, 1936-1943# 
^̂ Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression* VIII, 688# 
^̂ enderaon, op, clt,# 263-64# 
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elded policy) nor bocauao it merely Applauded 
and encouraged, but beoauee Hitler did appear 
to healtate â d the extremlet# of the party at 
once proceeded to fabricate aitwatloma calculated 
to make Hitler embark upon coureea which even he 
at time# aeema to have ahrunk from rlaklmg# 
The list is almost endleae of those who generally 
I bared theae opimiona of Rlbbentrop and the effect of 
lis advice upon Hitler# Included would be such pereonalltlea 
la weiaaaoker# Keaaelrlmg, von Haaaell, von Mackenaen* 
ind Ciano, to only mention a few. Some of theae m*en kept 
lay-to-̂ day dlarleê  other# reaerved their comment# for tb# 
;io#t*̂ war p#riod̂  and all had different reaeon# for writing* 
ôme wrote for pergonal vindication, other# to apologia# 
Tor Germany# But the fact rmnaina that all of theae men, 
#any of #iom were oleae to Eltler, Blbbentrop, and event# 
>f Uie time, e#eentlally agreed in their eatlmatlona of 
Îbbentrop and hi# influence upon Hitler* therefore It 
xeema reaaonable to conclude that Ribbentrop, frwa the 
»nd of hi# London ambaaeadorahlp to the attack on Poland, 
ionsletently edvlaed Hitler that Britain and the weatera 
power# were weak and unwilling to fight and thl# advice 
»z#rted an important, even major Influence upon Hitler 
md hi# decision»» 
CHAPTER VI 
CORCimiC* 
Esaeiitially thl# has be em a study of attitudes a ad 
InfluencesÎ or to be more precis®, the attitude# of 
roacblm von Rlbbentrop and hie l&fluenc# upon the pollole# 
u&d decielon# of Adolph Hitler* By It# mature* a etudy 
>f tble kind la both complex and laconoluelv#, oae about 
lAiloh the flaal word can probably aever be writ tea* But 
Mo&uee of It# oomgplexlty aad Inconoluelveme## It doe# mot 
thereby defy Imterpretaitlon or preclude one from drawing 
iertalm ooaclualome. 
Rlbbentrop*# meteoric rlee from a wine merchant to 
bhe Mlmlater of Pa reign Affair* of the Third Reloh within 
khe apace of aljc year# ]?epre#emt# a phenomenon In the 
realm of diplomacy, phenomenal becauee of hla lack of 
diplomatic preparation, R̂xy Hitler choae Rlbbentrop when 
3@ could have selected from among the many capable and 
experienced member® of the German foreign office can only 
)e anewered in term# of Rlbbentrop'# character and Hitler*# 
lletruat of German officialdom, 
Ih Rlbbentrop, Hitler found many appealing quailtie## 
ie wa# something of a yes—mn who. If he did not share 
-107-
•108-
lltler'a view#, at least seldom dle&greed with hi# Fuehrer* 
Ee always made it a policy to tell Hitler what he wanted 
vo hear and in thia manner warn able to burrow his way into 
litler'a oonfidenoe# Rlbbwtrop moreover poaaeaaed qwallt* 
ea whioh a at him apart from the uaual type of Hitler*# 
lubordinatea, He was wealthy, poliahed, widely travelled, 
tad fluent in three languagea* In addition, and probably 
*o#t important of all Ribbentrop waa o]̂ nly pro"»Brltiah 
Fith many important and influential Britiah oontaota# 
The claim that Rlbbentrop waa a fanatical devote# 
if the teneta of Ma%l ideology la queatlonable# What 
evidence there la tend* to ahow him aa a political oppor-
:unlat# Whether Hitler waa of thia opinion la ala# 
lueatlonable, but at leaat he found in Hibbentrop the type 
if man with whom he bad more in common than with the 
career diplomate of the Wllhelmatraaae* Ikeae latter were 
"ar too conaervative, ao the Fuehrer felt, to be enthual" 
latlo about idie dynamioa of the Rational Soclallat Revo* 
-utlon. Imatead, Hitler preferred more eager, more emotion* 
il iMn who would not ahrink from violence In executing 
:he dicta tea of the Nazi doctrine. ®x©so he considered 
lore important prerequla it lea than political intelligence 
ind formal preparation# And Rlbbentrop had all of these 
Luallflcatlona in abundance. 
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Mladful therefore of his British aemtlmeats mad 
îontftcts. Hitler sont Rib «ntrop to London im 1936 with 
She hope that be would be able to obtain the long*#ought 
Inglo-German alliancê  But Ribbentrop went to London an 
Inglophile end oame away an Anglophobe, Im the couree of 
lis ambassadorship, hie optimisa turned to peeaimiem, his 
Priendllneee te bittermeee# It warn a bittemeee bora of 
lieappointment# It wae In thle frame of mind that Rlbben* 
Krop formed hie dletorted and dleaetrou# oplniona of th* 
)rltl«h people* Be eame away from London oonvinoed Wiat 
Iritain wa# weak, that her «nplre wae deoaying* and that 
ler people we%*e wnwilllng to fight another war* In holding 
bheee view# in 1937 and 1938, Ribbentrop wa# not alone, for 
Ln theae year# there waa a decided, popular, and wlde#pread 
ivereion to war in both Britain and Mranoe# Rlbbentrop*# 
ai#judgement lay In hi# a##i#q»tion that there wa# no limit 
Ke what the people of Britain and Rranoe would endure from 
f«Ei œimany before they reeorted to war# 
Theee were unfortunate view# for one who headed the 
German foreign office and eteered C&erman foreign policy 
through the treaoherou# waters of the next two year#* 
garly in 1958, Hitler took a dim view of Ribbentrop*# 
malyai» of Britain, considering it a product of hi# ex­
aggerated Anglophobia# But am time passed. Hitler oame 
aore and more to share Ribbentrop*# calamitou# assumptions* 
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lh« policies and actl©a« of the #e»tem power# certainly 
seeawd to substantiate Blbbentrop*a contentions, for 
mparnce amd Britain even before bad atood paaaively by 
fhile Hitler reoccupied the PQiinelamd# When German troop# 
aarobed into lu#tria, again there were protests but ne 
concerted action, and when the west capitulated to Hitler 
it Munich (the hî  point of hi# hold over Europe), Hitler 
Ml# convinced of the eeirectne## of Ribbentrop*# advice* 
®ie que#tion caa be asked whether Hitler, by him-
#elf end without tdie help of Ribbentrop, would have arrived 
kt the#e #ame oonclueion#* To #ay that he would i# aelling 
tibbentrop*# influence a little short# Bad net Rlbbentrop 
)#en Hitler'# right hand man, it la very po##ible that 
Chi# poeition would have fellen to (>oering, and it i# well 
mown that (loering wa# much le#a warlike in hi# viewe and 
favored, inetead ef war, a #econd Munich* Oa the other 
aand̂  Hitler had much evidence to #ub#tantlate hi# oon* 
miction#, yet, at time# he appeared te heaitate and doubt 
bhe strength of the## conviction## When this ocoured, 
idbbentrop wa# at hi# #ide to #ugge#t and encourage# Thi# 
sees# to be the key factor in Rlbbentrop* a influence with 
hitler and partially, at least, answer# the que#tion of 
Aiether Hitler would have come to these perver## conclu#ion# 
without the Assistance of him foreign mini#ter* 
But in the period following Munich a gradual change 
ms evident in British policy# The Munich settlement was 
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ïot exactly popular* but at least It was generally felt 
La Britain that everything reaaoaable had been done to 
latlate Hitler*# territorial ambitlorn# In Europe, and 
klme had been Bwt there #a# aleo an increaae In 
military preparation# amd people began to face the thought 
)f war with more reality# On the other hand, Rlbbentrop*# 
rlew# regarding the west were eeeentlally unchanged# He 
knd Hitler approached the C%ech oriel# wl̂  confidence 
khat nothing wa# to be feared from either Prance or Britain# 
Ehelr confidence eeemed juetlfled* Pbr In March 1999 when 
31tler marched Into Prague# the weetem power# atood 
paealvely by* The time for a ahowdown had not yet arrived, 
)ut In Britain It *a# realized that the Munich agreement 
fa# jTxet another *#crap of paper'* and Hitler ambition# 
and not been aatlefled through appea#ement# 
With euoh remarimble #ucoe##e# behind them. It wm# 
aardly aetonlahlnĵ  that Hitler and Rlbbentrop turned to 
bhe Polish problem with aaaurence that their way wa# un-
»b# true ted. Bad not the Rhineland, Austria, Spain, Munich, 
knd Prague demon#trated that Britain and A»nce did not 
Intend to Interfere? Rlbbentrop wa# oonvlmced that there 
ra# little danger In another throw of the dice, and he 
kdvl̂ ed and encouraged Hitler to aettle the queetlon of 
3anzlg without fear of British intervention# He wa# 
apparently totally unaware of what Prague meant to the 
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îritlsh# Not a a fully convinced of Brltlah decay as 
tlbbentrop. Hitler entertained «one doubta* eepeolally 
ifter Britain gave her "blank check" to Poland in April 
L939* But Rlbbentrop kept up hi# conalatent advice, and 
fhen he brought horn® the Gemian*8ovlet fact Im Au guet 
1939, Hitler*# fear# were allayed, Sven after Britain 
md© her quarante® t© Poland official and Hitler again 
(bowed sign# of healtatlng, Rlbbentrop wa# at hi# #lde to 
id viae and encourage. And when finally confident that his 
"orelgn mlnleter wae correct. Hitler decided to tgJce the 
(top that plunged the world into the abyee of World War II, 
Da all the catalogue of crime# and ml#take# made by 
tlbbentrop and Hitler, the really declelve error lay In 
daelr failure to perceive Britain'# change of policy after 
hinlch and more pronouncedly after their rape of Prague, 
feither Hitler nor Rlbbentrop wa# obllvlou# of the surface 
reflection# of Britain*# policy, the Antl«Aggre##lon Front 
md guarantee to Poland were there for all to see* Rather 
;be mistake was in the interpretation Hitler and Rlbbma* 
;rop gave to these external sign# of Britain*# change of 
leart, Pbr them it wa# mare bluff, a feeble attempt to 
ntimldate Germany, In the Anglo*Poll#h Pact they failed 
;o #ee either any evidence of Brltlah political molality 
•r the extent to which Britain had indebted her national 
lonor. They failed to realize that this time Britain 
«•US"* 
could not back dowa# Rlbbentrop showed hlmwelf as aoot®-
thing considerable leas than the "eecond Bismarck" 
Hitler saw la him# Tn hla Ignorance, folly, caprlclouaneea, 
and dlplonmtlo Ineptneaa, he reaembed a eeooad Berchtold* 
The central que#tIon In thle eordld drama *111 
always be the extent of Hibbeatrop̂ s Influence on Hitler# 
To some, Retirath for Inetanoe, Rlbbentrop was a mere yes-
man. Hitler's meeRen̂ r̂ boy. To others, swch aa Ooerlng, 
Rlbbentrop*a Influence waa more algnlfloant, and Ooerlng 
frequently referred to **Rlbbentrop*3 war#" In reality, 
however, the extent of hie Influence aeeme to lie aomewhere 
between theae two extreme*# Rlbbentivp waa not wholly a 
yeê man, for he had atrong opinions of hla own and exerted 
conalderable effort to convince Hitler of the loglo of hla 
oonvlctlona# On the other hand, he had no real power to 
oxake policy declalona, and he realleed that the permanence 
of hla poaltlon Mated aolely on hla ability to pleaae the 
Fuehrer# 3ut Rlbbentrop took advantage of hla poaltlon 
to advlae and encourage Whenever Hitler faltered# Di 
this manner, Rlbbentrop waa an Important, and aometlmea 
even a major. Influence upon Hitler and hla declalona 




SamtenWlm, J&m## W#, Documeatarj BeokKroimd of World War 
II# 1931 to 1941. 'tSw' '"CoïuïaM'a'' ïïalVôraïly 'fress „ 
"I?48# 
Oermma fbreigm Office# Doeumeate OM. %e Eveate Frecedlag 
The Outbreak Of The W&p* IRrEi Qermea Llt)rary or 
1̂ 7olpm5lïoa7 %540. 
@reet Brlteim# The Brltleh War Blue Book. Dooumeat# Con# 
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t̂eî tlonal Affair#. 1933# Edited by ĵ obn ## 
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the diplomats and the diplomacy of the period* Sea* 
bury*a Wllhelmstras## is th@ best source thus far 
advanced"on the German foreign ofrice and German 
foreign policy under the Nazi regime* It la well 
documented and represents a great deal o: careful re* 
search# Marnier*8 books ar# of a more general nature, 
giving a blow-by-blow account of the main diplomatic 
events of the critical years, 1936#1959# The Diplomat#, 
although less helpful, is a well documented source anë"" 
has a valuable section on Rlbbentrop and the German 
foreign office* 
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Sohm&TZ*» p&ie Nkm Ribbaatrop #&# a valuable 
source to®cause ki;'''provided'' one of the few accesses 
to Ribb#nfcr©p*s early life and baokgroimd, ÎM* 
dooixmented, the facte are meetly related fpom memory 
and at tlmwa are mot In agreement with other writer## 
Schwar% wee decidedly antl«̂ Rlbbentrop and hi# book 
ehould be need with extreme oautlom# 
%r eeeondary material# of a more apeelfle mature* 
8etom*#ateom*# From Munich., Schuman*» Europe, and 
liheeler*Bemm#tt'# Kerne# 1# are eepeolally good. Wheeler* 
Bennett*# Rememle lg'''¥y"""̂ far the mo#t exhawetlve but 
deal# prlmarTIŷ lth the military aepeet of the Kami 
regime# Both Sehimen and setom*Wat#om wrote before 
the emd of the war and thereby without the eeeentlal 
doouNAntary material* Seton Wateon leave# many 
qweetlon# m%an#wered# Rie book# by Wedllcott* Raymer* 
Boetxeoh# and Wlekemen were of little value* 
IV. Article# 
mbaeeador No 1,* Time. XXIX (February 16, 1937)# 92*25* 
rltalm Veer# Toward Oermany.* Mew Rerubllo. IXXXIII (July 
17, 1»%), 867.6$* 
no, Jeeef, "The I*at Mile Of Appeaeememt," Jŵ al Of 
Central ̂ ropeam Aff̂ mlre. I (April 1941),""5?I?# 
mc, Joeef* "From Pragne Te Wareaw,* Jourmal Of Central 
European Affair#. I, (Ooteber 1941), iwV-aS?# 
erd Ballfaz Dk Germany.* Contemporary Review. GLIII 
(January 1958), lOl-Ogu: 
vine, Allan* "%e Anglo«German #aval Agreement," Current 
HI#tory. Xtll (Aû t 1955), 506*12, 
Ole, DeWitt C# "tight On Aiel Ferel̂  Î llcy," R»relfm 
Affair#. XX7 (Ooteber 1946), 150*54. 
epreeentatlve Men, Herr von Rlbbemtrop, " fhe 19ngll#h 
Review. IXII (April 1956), 415*̂ 15. 
ibbentrop* Hitler*# Gloved Band," The Literary Dlgeet, 
CXXI (mreh 26, 1956), 58* 
rthelmer, Mildred* "The Foreign Policy of The ihlrd 
Reich," Foreign Policy Report#. X (Marèh 28, 1954), 
-121. 
rth@lmer# Mildred* '"Alma of Hitler's Foreign Policj,* 
Pbrelga Policy Reports, XI (Jime 5, 1935% 70'»83« 
bo Is Rlbbemtrop," Living Age# CCCL (Juae 1936), 528# 
Wolf«|i Henry C* ""̂ USben̂ opt Hitler's Oracle," 
Oarremt History, LI (December 1939)* 23*25# 
Unfortimately, litte bae been publlabed by way 
of periodical literature on Rlbbentrop and bla dlplo-
maey# What has been published differs litte In value 
from moet of the eecondery material# The article* In 
the Rnf̂ lleh R,, Llvl̂  Age# and Lit» Dlgeet# represent 
the cosŒEBOïi type o|oumaïls tic impreaelon# and were 
of little value* The article# by Wdlf# w#e more 
valuable but only In a general way# %ie atartllng 
fact In meet of theee artlclem le that the majority 
of the writer# hailed Rlbbentrop a# a great and coming 
etateemany from whom great deed# could be expected In 
the future# Bow wrong they were. 
The two article# by Ranc repreeented #ON* careful 
reeearch and provided good background material, 
Pbr article# of a epeclflc naturê  the two on 
Halifax*# vlelt and the Anglo-Oenman Naval Agreement 
were eomewhat helpful. 3he two article# by Wertĵ lmer 
were valiant att̂ p̂t# but written mwch too cloee te 
the period, without benefit of doccwntary material# 
Of all the article#, the one by Poole wae the meet 
valuable# Boole wrote from authority &e he wa# a 
member of the U*S* State Department team In charge of 
evaluating and eelectlng the captured Oerman document# 
for the Nuremberg %»lal# and aleo had the opportunity 
of Interrogating m#iAy of Wie Wael# on trial# In hi# 
article, Poole emmarlze# the main event# of the period 
1933*1939 with a revealing dlecuaelon of Hitler̂  
Rlbbentrop, and Wael foreign policy* fbr a eeemlngly 
accurate thumbnail eketeh of the background of World 
War 11̂  thl# 1# an excellent eource* 
V, Mew#paper# 
t York Time# 
R»r aeveral reaaon# the Rew York Time# we# the 
only newepaper eource eoneulted# Many ô er excellent 
new#paper eource# could have been used, notable of 
which would have been the London Time#, Kanofaeater 
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mad the pally Telegraph, but due to the 
expenme involved tSe«e wei©" met ooneulted » It m® 
thought that the *e# Yerk Time# would give the beet, 
meet eoeuréte* enZTw#Tl»ompre&neIve eeeowats of 
event# eceurlng In Europe during thl# period elnoe 
meny of it# dl# pa tehee were tmkem from London end 
Berlin newepeper releases, appearing In thle country 
a day later# A# It worked eut the 9ew %rk Time# 
provided many bit# of Information aol̂ reSHTlyoofa la-
able from memolre and offlolal doouetente# It wae 
of eepeolal help in tracing the detail# of Rlbbentrop*# 
ambaeeadorehlp In %#ndom# 
